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Objectives 
 
1. Analyze contemporary trends in the geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major historical 
impacts, its geopolitical potential and the responce to the modern geopolitical challenges; 
2. Evaluate Ukraine’s geopolitical interests in the relations with its strategic partners such as the 
United States, Russian Federation and the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe; 
 
3. Define the role of Ukraine in the regional and global processes;  
 
4. Accumulate and analyze data on Ukraine’s geopolitical trends in order to support arguments 
to develop own optimal geopolitical concept of Ukraine. 
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Overview 
 
The development of the modern system of international relations is different compared to 
the such development in the last century. In the era of social and economic inequality our 
civilization created such global problems as food shortages, terrorism, corruption, proliferation 
of deadly weapons, ecological disasters, demographic processes, escalation of conflicts for 
energy resources and many other problems.  
 
In this case, geopolitics has become an increasingly important study as the world faced 
with rising competition for regional and global domination. This competition greatly affects the 
system of international relations and provokes the shift in the balance of power, dividing the 
world into geopolitical players and geopolitical subjects. Ukraine, being the largest contigious 
European state at the crossroads between Eurasian Russia and Western European civilization, 
emphasizes the importance to promote its geopolitical interests and further development of its 
geopolitical doctrine in order to become the most influential geopolitical player in the region. In 
this regard, the thesis promotes greater understanding of recent trends in Ukraine’s geopolitics, 
its impact on the global processes, analyses the geostrategic relations between Ukraine and its 
partners, and provides evaluation of Ukraine’s geopolitics in the future. 
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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the analysis of contemporary trends in the 
geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major periods in the formation of its 
geopolitcs, geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the relations with strategic partners, 
and assessing eventual development of Ukraine’s geopolitics with a special 
emphasis on the cooperation within global universal international organizations 
such as the United Nations . 
The research applies an analysis of history of Ukraine’s geopolitics in 
order to promote a better understanding of recent trends in the country’s foreign 
policy and its geopolitical interests, analyze the relations of Ukraine with its 
strategic partners, including the United States, countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, and provide an assessment for the future Ukraine’s 
geopolitics. In this regard, the study argues that the Ukraine‘s geopolitics and its 
interests are determined by the large scale of factors, which derive from historical, 
socio-cultural, geographic, political and economic specifics of Ukraine.  
Based on the analysis of the main trends in the modern Ukraine‘s 
geopolitics, assesment of Ukraine‘s geopolitical potential and the current global 
geopolitical situation, the thesis concludes that there are prospects for a creation of 
a new Ukraine‘s geopolitical doctrine. At the same time, the study argues that 
Ukraine needs to continue its political and socio-economic reforms in order to 
become an influential regional leader and promote further development of its 
geopolitical interests. 
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Anotace 
Tato práce je zaměřena na analýzu současných trendů v geopolitice Ukrajiny, 
zvýrazněním hlavních období formovani geopolitiky, geopolitických zájmu Ukrajiny 
ve vztazích se strategickými partnery, a posuzování eventuálního rozvoje geopolitky 
Ukrajiny. Zvláštní důraz ja kladen na spolupráci v rámci  mezinárodních organizaci, 
např. Organizace spojených národů. 
Výzkum aplikuje analýzu dějin geopolitky Ukrajiny s cílem podpořeni 
lepšího pochopení současných trendů zahraniční politiky země a její geopolitických 
zájmu, analyzy vztahu Ukrajiny s jejími strategickými partnery, včetně Spojených 
států, zemí střední a východní Evropy, Ruska a zemi Společenství nezávislých států, 
a poskytnuti hodnocení budoucnosti ukrajinské geopolitiky. V tomto ohledu studie 
tvrdí, že ukrajinská geopolitika a jeji zájmy jsou určeny širokou škálou faktorů, které 
jsou odvozeny od histoických, socio-kulturních, geografických, politických a 
ekonomických zvláštnosti Ukrajiny. 
Na základě analýzy hlavních trendů v geopolitce moderní Ukrajiny, 
hodnocení ukrajinského geopolitického potenciálu a současné globální geopolitické 
situace, práce  dochází k závěru, že jsou perspektivy pro vytvoření nové geopolitické 
doktríny Ukrajiny. Současně, studie tvrdí, že Ukrajina musí pokračovat ve svých 
politických a sociálně-ekonomických reformach, aby se stala vlivným regionálním 
lídrem a podporovala další rozvoj svých geopolitických zájmu 
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Introduction 
The geopolitics has become an increasingly important within the theory of 
international relations as the world’s political situation has changed due to the rising 
competition among the states for regional and global domination. The competition 
for the political, geographical, economic, cultural, ideological and religious 
domination significantly affected the system of international relations and provoked 
the shift in the balance of power, dividing the world into the two categories of states. 
The first category includes geopolitical players, countries, which conduct their own 
independent foreign policy, based on the protection of its national interests, and play 
an important role in the providing of security and stability in a region or world in 
total. Other category includes objects of such policy, countries, which fail to 
influence the political, economic or socio-cultural situation due to their weak 
geopolitical potential. 
\ 
Ukraine, being the largest contiguous European state, owns a great 
geopolitical potential. Its large territories, an access to the Black and Asov seas, 
demographic potential (more than 48 million people), rich mineral resources, 
military potential, high level of intellectual, scientific and economic potential, 
including high-technologies (like aerospace engineering and nuclear research), make 
Ukraine an important geopolitical player in the region. Ukraine emphasizes the 
importance to continue its further political and socio-economic development in order 
to keep this status. In this regard, the thesis promotes greater understanding of recent 
trends in Ukraine’s geopolitics, analyses its history of development, the geostrategic 
relations of Ukraine with its partners and the role of Ukraine in the complex of 
globalization processes. 
Subject Significance 
Traditionally geopolitics was considered as the science about the 
geographical aspects of international relations, the influence of territorial size and 
military potential on the political actions of the state. However, today there is a need 
in the totally new concept of geopolitics. The modern geopolitical activity of the 
state can be defined as activity of the subject of international relations in the context 
of the whole range of different factors (not only geographic) in order to realize its 
vital geopolitical interests.  
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 The last decade of the XX century is characterized with the large-scale socio-
political changes associated with the transformation of the entire global geopolitical 
space. For Ukraine as one of the key geopolitical players on the political map of 
Europe it is extremely important to develop own modern geopolitical concept, which 
would respond its geographic, historical, political, demographic, economic and 
socio-cultural interests. 
. Under these conditions, the research of Ukraine’s geopolitics acquires 
additional attention. The modern Ukrainian geopolitics, as a part of world’s 
geopolitical science, has just started to develop. However, the modern research of 
Ukraine’s geopolitics is characterized with an increasing number of Ukrainian and 
foreign political scientists, who choose this issue as their field of interest. At the 
same time, we believe that our study will also contribute to the theoretical research of 
Ukraine’s geopolitics, its interests and goals in the context of globalization processes. 
The relevance of topic being researched in this thesis is determined by the 
following main reasons: 
 1. As we have previously mentioned modern geopolitics of Ukraine 
undergoes the process of its development and formation. Under these conditions our 
thesis will have scientific importance as the contribution to the comprehensive 
scientific research of modern Ukraine’s geopolitics and its interests.  
2. Ukraine as a sovereign independent state conducts its foreign policy on the 
basis of mutual beneficial and cooperative ties with other countries. The relations 
with these countries directly influence the geopolitics of Ukraine. This research is 
called to explore the challenges and major geopolitical problems of Ukraine in the 
context of the geostrategic relations with its partners, such as the United States, 
Russian Federation and the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. The conclusions of 
this thesis will help better understanding of the current Ukraine’s geopolitical 
processes.   
3. It is extremely important for us to study a problem of Ukrainian 
geopolitical interests in the context of cooperation with international regional and 
global organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
GUAM - Georgia – Ukraine - Azerbaijan – Moldova - Organization for Democracy 
and Economic Development (GUAM), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
European Union (EU), the Visegrad Group and the United Nations (UN). The 
Cooperation with the United Nations in the political, socio-economic and 
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humanitarian spheres in the context of solving of global problems has an especial 
interest for us.  
 
The main objectives of the thesis are to analyze contemporary trends in the 
geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major historical impacts, its geopolitical 
potential and the response to the modern geopolitical challenges; evaluate Ukraine’s 
geopolitical interests in the relations with its strategic partners such the United States, 
Russian Federation and the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe; define the role 
of Ukraine in the regional and global processes; accumulate and analyze data on 
Ukrainian geopolitical trends in order to support arguments to develop modern 
geopolitical concept of Ukraine. 
 
The object of research includes the global political space, which was 
cardinally changed due to the geopolitical transformation processes in the modern 
system of international relations. The geopolitics of Ukraine, its geopolitical interests 
and the role of Ukraine in the context of globalization processes are referred as 
subject of research. 
 
The theoretical and methodological basis of a research is the legislative 
documents of Ukraine, government analytical reports related to the sphere of 
international relations of Ukraine, scientific and theoretical studies of Ukrainian and 
foreign political scientists on the geopolitics of Ukraine. This thesis applies 
gnoseological, philosophical, historical and political analysis of Ukraine’s 
geopolitics and its interests. In addition retrospective analysis of history of Ukraine 
showed the stages of formation and development of Ukraine's geopolitical 
orientation and the main trends of modern national geopolitics. We widely used a 
comparative method to compare similar phenomena of social and political processes 
in the different periods of Ukrainian history in order to define the general interests 
and principles of Ukraine’s geopolitics. The system method allowed us to consider 
geopolitics as a whole, well-structured and well-organized system, which is defined 
by a large number of different factors.  Functional method helped us to explore the 
strategic relations between the countries and their economic and political cooperation 
in order to predict the nature of possible problems. This method is based on the 
positive, mutually beneficial and pragmatic character and used in the analysis of 
relations between Ukraine and the USA, Russia and the CIS and CEE countries. The 
research is based on the principles of objectivity, historical principle, and specificity.  
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Theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis are works of scholars, 
specializing on problems of geopolitics, history of diplomacy and foreign policy, 
international relations, problems of transition countries, international organizations 
and global studies. In particular, approaches to the Ukraine’s geopolitics, presented 
in the works of such scholars as  John A. Agnew, Nayyar Shamsi, Saul Bernard 
Cohen, Colin S. Gray, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, Lalita 
Rana, Pushpesh K. Pant, C. Dale Walton, Nurit Kliot, David Newman, Richard 
Jackson, Neil Howe, Henry L. Bretton, Myron Weiner, Sharon Stanton Russell, 
Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal, Chris Brown, Martin Griffiths, Terry 
O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, Valerie Hansen, Kenneth Curtis, Kenneth R. Curtis, 
Orest Subtelny, Janet Martin, Osyp Zinkevych, Andrew Sorokowski, Paul Robert 
Magocsi, Bohdan Nahaylo, Richard Pipes, James P. Nichol, Robert Legvold, Celeste 
A. Wallander, Ilya Prizel, Serhii Plokhy, Yuriy Lypa, Kataryna Wolczuk, David R. 
Marples, Jan Zielonka, Alex Pravda, Anders Aslund, F. Stephen Larrabee, Serhiy 
Datsiuk, Volodymyr Hranovsky, Andrew Evans, Marc Di Duca, Dominique 
Auzias, Jean-Paul Labourdette and many others. 
In particular, approaches to the analyses of the early history of formation of 
Ukraine’s geopolitics presented in the works of such authors as Paul Robert Magocsi, 
Osyp Zinkevych, Orest Subtelny, Serhiy Plokhy, Ilya Prizel, Bohdan Nahaylo. 
Martin Malia. For example, Orest Subtelny in his book “Ukraine: a history”, 
published by the University of Toronto, argues that Ukraine did not appear with the 
dissolution of the USSR in 1991, but Ukraine is a state with more than 1000 year 
history, which starts from Kievan Rus. The history of Ukraine is a history of 
Ukrainian nation in the struggle for own independence. The author offers an 
assessment of the various events in the history of Ukraine to help better 
understanding of its historical, geographical, political, economic and socio-cultural 
characteristics. Furthermore, Orest Subtelny discusses how those historical 
challenges reflected in the idea of Ukrainian dream and its national interests. 
To analyze the history of Ukraine’s geopolitical thought in the Soviet period 
we explored the works of such scholars James P. Nichol, L. G. Churchward, Jeffrey 
Zuehlke, Serhiy Plokhy, Ilya Prizel, Yuriy Lypa and Kataryna Wolczuk. One of such 
works a book “Diplomacy of Former Soviet Republics”, published by James Nichol, 
is the first comprehensive study about the diplomatic institution and diplomatic 
activities of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, in the late Gorbachev 
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era. The clear understanding of the history of Ukraine in this period helps us to 
explore the geopolitical interests and potential of Ukraine before the dissolution of 
the USSR and new era of independent geopolitical thought. James Nichol states that 
Ukraine as the second biggest Soviet state received a great territorial, industrial, 
military and demographic potential. According to the author we will analyze, on 
which geopolitical potential Ukraine could base its modern geopolitical doctrine and 
how Ukraine could improve its modern geopolitical position. 
The evaluation of Ukrainian geostrategic relations in the context of relations 
with other states, including the United States, Russia, and the countries of Central-
Eastern Europe, is based on the analyses provided in the books and reports of           
F. Stephen Larrabee, Oleksandr Pavlyuk, Andriy Yermolaev, Martin Kelly, Andrew 
Jeffrey, Nataliya Bets and others. Each of these authors gives its personal opinion on 
the strategic importance of Ukraine’s relations with its partners. However, such 
relations could be helpful, only if they are mutually beneficial and respond the 
national interests. Ukraine should pay an especial attention to the relations with its 
neighboring states in order to provide security and stability in the regions. In the 
analytical report “Ukraine and the Visegrad Group: achievements, problems and 
perspective of collaboration”, Nataliya Bets explores the strategic importance of such 
relation with the Visegrad States in the context of common historical events, 
transition economic and political processes and socio-cultural similarities. At the 
same time the author argues that Ukraine has a high interest in the cooperation with 
the Visegrad states within a framework of regional organizations, including the 
Visegrad Group. 
Since the thesis also focuses on the Ukraine’s role in the globalization 
processes, a large number of reports, official statements by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Ukraine, Administration of the President of Ukraine, Permanent Mission 
of Ukraine to the United Nations, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Embassies 
of Ukraine to the United States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and other 
countries, Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers 
of Ukraine, Parliament of Ukraine, think tanks, institutes for strategic studies and 
news agencies of Ukraine are used as a basis the analysis for the theoretical 
considerations and practical part of this thesis. However, today we would like to 
highlight the article, written by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
“Problems without passports”. We should mention that the last sub-chapter and 
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partly conclusion part was based on the article of Kofi Annan. The significance of 
this article consists in the fact that: it evaluates the humanity problems in the context 
of all international community, assesses the global strategies in the solving of these 
problems, and announce the proposal to include the global problems to the 
geopolitical doctrines of each state.  
Practical and theoretical value of this thesis is that the main part and 
conclusions of the thesis are a contribution to the theoretical study about the 
geopolitics and geopolitical interests of Ukraine, its role in the cooperation with other 
countries in the context of modern globalization processes. In the practical context, 
the results of this thesis can assist the further research of Ukraine’s geopolitics, 
increasing the political culture of politicians, diplomats and other decision-makers of 
Ukraine and other states. The conclusions of the work will help to understand the 
current geopolitical processes in Ukraine and region. The parts of thesis can be also 
used for the teaching and the developmemt of special courses on geopolitics of 
Ukraine in the universities, preparation of diplomatic personal for the embassies in 
Ukraine and other spheres of international relations. Results of this thesis can be used 
for developing and teaching courses „Geopolitics of Ukraine“, „Ukraine and 
Globalization," „Ukraine in the system of International Relations“ and other related 
courses. 
 
Conclusions about the need of modern geopolitical concept of Ukraine, 
assessments of Ukraine’s role in the context of globalization processes and solving of 
global problems, and conclusions about the Ukraine’s geopolitical future will be 
provided as well.  
 
It will be concluded that Ukrainian geopolitical doctrine should focus on 
multidimensional foreign policy of Ukraine, protection of its geopolitical interests 
and further processes of national socio-economic development. 
Thesis Disposition 
In order to promote a better understanding of the history of Ukraine’s 
geopolitical interests, modern trends of Ukraine’s geopolitical thought, the current 
state of Ukraine’s geostrategic relations with its partners and the role of Ukraine in 
the globalization processes, the thesis is structured into an introduction, four 
substitutive chapters and conclusion part. 
 
 20 
In the introduction part we explain the choice of topic for research, its 
relevance, identify the object and subject of research, formulate objectives of the 
research, describe the theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis, give 
information about the theoretic and practical value of thesis, and present the structure 
of the research. 
The first chapter seeks to define the term “geopolitics” and “interest” in 
general. The view of geopolitics and interests from the scholars of different 
geopolitical schools are presented. The various approaches and concepts are explored 
and followed by the definition of term “geopolitics” and “interest” in the context of 
our topic.  
 
The second chapter discusses the history of formation of Ukraine’s 
geopolitical concept in the different periods. In order to have a better understanding 
of Ukrainian geopolitics and interests we will explore the international relations, 
political traditions and culture in three different epochs: the period of Kievan Rus, 
Soviet Era and modern times.  
 
The third chapter aims to analyze activities of Ukraine in the sphere of 
international relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, the United 
States, Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. We will 
carry a research on the bilateral relations between Ukraine and these countries in the 
sphere of political, economic, military and socio-cultural cooperation. The main 
geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the context of partnership with other countries are 
our task to explore in this chapter. 
 
In the fourth chapter we want to explore geopolitical interests of Ukraine 
within such global organization as the United Nations, activities of Ukraine in the 
solving of global problems and future challenges to the geopolitics of Ukraine.  
 
Finally, conclusions about the major trends in the development of Ukraine’s 
geopolitics, its geopolitical interests in the relations with other countries and 
international organizations, Ukraine’s role in the solving of global problems, and the 
optimal Ukraine’s geopolitical doctrine are presented in the conclusion part of 
Thesis. 
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1. Theoretical considerations 
In this chapter we will explain the basic principals of geopolitics and national 
interest in the theory of international relations, before the term “geopolitics” and 
“national interest” will be defined. In the following chapters of this thesis we will 
also focus on the analyze of the main historical, geographical, economic, socio-
cultural and political factors of geopolitics, its influence on the decision-making 
processes and the role of geopolitics in the protection of vital national interests of 
each country (on our case: Ukraine)  
 Today when the world faced with global political changes, the understanding 
of modern geopolitical principals is very important. That’s why, the complex 
analysis of the main geopolitical approaches to the theory of international relations 
together with a deep considerations on the issue of current globalization processes 
will make a theoretical base of this thesis. 
 
1.1. The definition of geopolitics 
The history of geopolitics starts with the dawn of civilization. However, 
according to the history of the term “geopolitics” began in 1899, when the Swedish 
political scientist Rudolf Kjellén used that definition at the first time.1 He described a 
geopolitics as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in 
space, i.e., as land, territory, area, or most especially, as country… or the study of the 
strategies of political organisms in space”.2 Kjellén also believed that each state had 
to fulfill 3 main principles to become a world power. First, all states had to be 
spacious and located within a large territory. Second, states were forced to have 
“internal cohesion”. Great Britain can not become a world power, because of its 
problems with Irish and Welsh dissidents. Third, states had to have a “freedom pf 
movement” to become a world power.3    
   For Karl Haushofer, the father of German school of geopolitics, “Geopolitics 
is the new national science of state, a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all 
political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially political 
geography”.4 Haushofer wanted to build German school of geopolitik based on the 
                                                          
1
 John A. Agnew, Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics, Routledge, 2003, p.5. 
2
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strong ties between the concept of a natural boundary and idea of continuous 
territorial expansion. The geopolitics had to become the geographic conscience of the 
state.5 Today the level of Haushofer’s influence on the German foreign policy is 
seriously debated. However, we may definitely claim that Karl Haushofer had a great 
impact on the policy of the Third Reich and its leaders. 
Anglo-American school of geopolitics differed from the German school, 
because of its representatives who were explicitly anti-Nazi. Sir Halford Mackinder, 
Nickolas J. Spykman and the US Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan were among the 
founders of future Anglo-American geopolitics.  
For example, Halford Mackinder’s ideas are important for three reasons.  
First, he had a very global view on the international relations: the geopolitics 
is a new invented perspective to explore the globe as “closed” political space, to see 
the competition between the great powers as one unified scene. Second, Mackinder 
created a unique map “The natural seats of power” (Figure 1). An interpretation of 
the Earth with the centering of the map on Eurasia made that region pivotal and 
North and South American marginal. At the same time he labeled other areas with 
such names as “pivot area” or heartland, “inner or marginal crescent” and “lands of 
the outer or insular crescent”.6  
Third, Mackinder is also remembered because of his “the geographical 
causation of history”. The central part of this history is the relationship between 
physical geography and transportation technologies.  Halford Mackinder defines 
three epochs of history - pre-Columbian, Columbian and Post-Columbian (Table 1). 
The author also stresses on the importance of trans-continental European 
transportation system.7  
Mackinder divided the surface of the Earth in the World Island (Europe, Asia 
and Africa) and Periphery (Americas, the British Isles, Oceania). The World Island is 
much bigger than Periphery and has better location for its industries. The core of the 
World Island or Heartland is the Eastern Europe. It is comprised of Ukraine, Western 
Russia and Mittleuropa, where Ukraine contains a huge reserve of grain and natural 
resources, large territory and the location in the center of Heartland.8  
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From the Mackinder’s point of view, the unique location and large deposits of 
natural resources together with a large territory has to become the main core of 
Ukraine’s geopolitics. Today we may definitely agree with the author and will try to 
prove this fact in the following chapters of the thesis. 
Another American political scientist Alfred Mahan claimed that the naval 
supremacy had the primary and foremost importance. Navy might help a state to 
annex new territories and protect own sovereignty. He also argued that all the seas 
and oceans were interconnected in the world. Its control gave a state a military 
advantage and control over the see trade routs. The state, which was dominating in 
the waters around the world, determined the flow of the trade and prevented other 
state from the challenging those situation.9  
Analyzing the thoughts of American scientists, we may come to conclusion 
that it is obvious that further development of transportation system in Ukraine 
together with its gas-transporting pipeline system, access to the see ports in Black 
and Asov seas, satellite and rocket launch space programs could also bring additional 
benefits to the country’s geopolitical potential.  
At the same time modern geopolitics makes not only the size and shape of 
territory and access to the sea significant, but also a plenty of other factors. A group 
of modern geopoliticians stress on the importance of economic factors in the state 
power. Such factors as natural resources, location along land trade roots, agricultural 
potential, level of economic development and innovations define the economic 
power of the state.10  
Such geo-economists, like Ronald R. Pollina, Mickey Kantor, Oliver 
Williamson, Stephan Haggard, see the struggle for economic domination as the 
future replacement of the traditional geopolitics. They claim that power in the terms 
of global market is more important than military capability of the state or the size of 
territory. The states operate now in the borderless world, because of the globalization 
processes, which erase the boundaries and promote a new ideology of market and 
free trade.11 
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Geopoliticians also explore an impact of population on the geopolitics. The 
connection between the population size and the state’s power was important 
throughout history. From Pericles to Augustus every leader looked for any ways to 
encourage the size of population in order to raise it strength and prestige.12 In the 
words of Hans Morgenthau “no country can remain or become a first-rate power 
which does not belong to the most populous nations of the earth”.13 According to the 
A. Organski, “Population size is the most important determinant of national power. 
With it, a lack of other determinants of power can be overcome. Without it, great 
power status is impossible”14 Headley Bull, a well-known American social scientist, 
also recognized an importance of the population: “A population of 100 or more today 
is not sufficient to confer a superpower status upon a nation, but it is widely thought 
to be necessary for this status”.15 In our case Ukraine as the 48-million country 
belongs to the most populous European states and possesses a great demographic 
potential. 
Samuel Cohen defines geopolitics as “the analysis of the interaction between, 
on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political 
processes. The settings are composed of geographical forms and patterns and the 
multilayered regions that they form. The political processes include forces that 
operate at the international level and those on the domestic scene that influence 
international behavior. Both geographical and political processes are dynamic, and 
each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the 
consequences of this interaction.”16 
Talking into account the facts listed above, we may say that the definition of 
geopolitics is broader that just the interaction between the geographical perspectives 
such as the size and shape of territory or its location and the political process. This 
term includes also the socio-cultural, economic, historical, religious and other 
factors, which define the geopolitics of each country and its national interests. 
As a result today we would like to formulate our personal definition of the 
term “geopolitics”. The geopolitics is the national doctrine of the state or its national 
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science, which is called to form and promote a strategy of decision-making processes 
that would protect vital national interests. This strategy is often based on the 
territorial size and location of the state, its military strength, natural resources, 
population, economic growth, historical and socio-cultural development. 
 
1.2. The term of interest in the geopolitics 
Today many politicians and political scientists talk about the importance of 
state or national interest in the domestic and foreign policy. However, only few of 
them can explain the definition of term, which stands behind the word “national 
interest” in the geopolitics.  
The term “national interest” remains one of the most important issues to 
research in the modern theory of international relations, geopolitics and foreign 
policy analysis. A number of political scientists, geopoliticians, military analytics try 
to find answers on the questions - What is the national interest? What is the 
difference between the interest and national interest? What is the link between 
national interests and foreign policy?  
 It is extremely complicated to find a precise definition to the term “national 
interest”. It is a fact that the “national interest” is a fundamental principle guiding the 
foreign policy of state. Each state is unique and develops its own foreign policy to 
protect its national geopolitical interests. The “national interest” relates to the state’s 
geographic, strategic-military and strategic-economic positions in the region and 
global aspects. These positions might be differently interpreted by the every single 
state. However, the fact is whatever is said to be a “national interest” is an integral 
part of the “national heritage” passed from one generation to another to plan, 
formulate and conduct the state’s foreign policy. 17 
The “national interest” might be changed and shaped under the different 
circumstances. If these circumstances make a state more powerful that it was before, 
the national interest become different. In this case not only the national interest is 
dynamic, but the power position and the state’s foreign policy vary with time. That is 
why, the “national interest” of the certain state we should determine by its current 
political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances.18 
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The difference between the “interest” and “national interest” might be 
explained in the following way. A national interest is usually referred to the 
relatively homogenous society with its policy preferences and certain internalized 
norms, which are considered as appropriate. A national interest can also exist when 
the states have domestic institutions that represent some individuals or groups, who 
follow the same interests as state. In realist theories the “national interest” is 
considered as to be state power (Morgenthau, 1978), and neorealists argue that 
national interests are state survival at minimum, but state power at maximum (Waltz, 
1979). The survival can be explained as the elemental goal needed to pursue all the 
political aims.19 
The interest in the “national interest” was always central to international 
relations and foreign policy analysis. The constructive approach is developed in this 
area, because of its focus on the social base involved in the formation of international 
relations. Most of the scholars claim that the national interests are at base ideas about 
needs. Non-constructivists argue that the content of those interests is unchangeable 
and derives from the combination of such desires as survival, power, security and 
wealth. However, these socially constructed natures of interest are still determined by 
the material resources and geopolitical situation in the world. 20 
Sometimes national interests may be complex and difficult to identify, but the 
realists propose to assume that whatever else states seek, they want to gain the power 
in order to achieve other goals and protect its own interests. The power is also a 
complex notion. It is not only a power as a “capability”, a required physical force to 
achieve goals, but political power, an effective skill to protect own political, socio-
cultural, economic and other national interests.21 
Analyzing the difference between the constructivism and other approaches in 
the defining of national interest we should not say that only constructivists divide the 
interest as fixed and given, or research how the national interests might be influenced 
at the level of geopolitical situation in the world. For example, a non-constructivist 
Andrew Moravcsik develops a liberal theory of how the states interests derive from 
the domestic economic interests. Stephen Krasner, a representative of realist school, 
argues that by presenting national interests the individual rulers want to ensure their 
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personal survival as leaders. Jon Pevehouse uses rationalist tools to analyze how the 
constitution of the state and its interests are influenced by their membership in the 
regional and global organizations.22 
Traditional geopolitics, which was based on the assumptions of political 
realism, stresses on the significance of state sovereignty and national interests.  
National interest is also an important term in the theory of international relations. 
National interest as a concept attracted a great attention of scholars after the World 
War II. This concept usually divided in two ways. The first way interprets the word 
“interest” as a need that has the status of an acceptable claim on behalf of the state. 
On the other hand, the word “interest” might be also used to describe and support 
particular policies. In this case, the main problem is how to determine the criteria of 
the correspondence between the interest as a principle and policy, which it is 
applied.23 
To define the criteria link the concept to the foreign policy and geopolitics 
Martin Griffiths, an Australian specialist on the theory of international relations, 
offers us three ways. The first approach (Elitist approach), we may simply equate the 
national interest with those, who are responsible for the foreign policy 
(implementation of national geopolitical doctrine). In this case the national interest is 
what the decision-makers of the state claim about it. The national interest is also 
something, which defined and defended by the state authority, which have the 
specific knowledge and the power to represent the whole country. The second 
approach derives from the realist school of thought and explained the national 
interest in the terms of the nature of international relations and the motivations of 
state. In the anarchic system of the international relations the security is the main 
goal for the foreign policy of every single state. However, such foreign policy should 
be based on the national interests of the state. The interest is often defined in the 
terms of power, and power in the terms of interest. The last third approach explains 
that democratic states identify its national interests when it derives from the nation’s 
preferences. The national interests can be identified by the external observers, but 
only by the standards of the nation itself.24 
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2. The nature and genesis of the geopolitics in Ukraine 
2.1.The roots of Ukrainian geopolitics 
Analyzing the geopolitics of Ukraine we have to deeply undrestand the 
geography, history and culture of this country. Ukrainian geopolitical interests were 
formed for more than one thousand-year period that covers a time from the epoch of 
mighty Kievan Rus with center in Kiev, the precursor to the future slavic Eastern 
European countries, to the modern geopolitical thought of Ukraine in the XXI 
century. The first geopolitical thoughts and concepts of Kievan Rus were mainly 
about the unique location of state in the center of Europe, large territories and access 
to the Black and Asov seas.  
A size of territory and its location on the crossroads of the main Eastern and 
Western trade routs made Kiev soon the main trading outpost in a region. Kievan 
Rus hold a strong position on the strengthening of its economic ties with other 
countries. In 911 and 945 the Principality of Kiev signed a treaty with Byzantium 
that allowed Rus to do business in Constantinopole. Throughout the 10th century the 
princes of Kiev lead a policy on the elimination of their political rivals, including the 
Khazars and the Bulgars. 25 
As we know in the 11th century Kievan Rus became geographically the 
largest political conglomeration in Europe (Figure 2)  and one of the most 
sophisticated and the most flourishing economies at the time.26 How did the leaders 
of Kievan Rus achieve such result? What strategy was chosen to protect the national 
interests of the historical Ukraine? To anwer these questions we have to go back to 
the oldest East Slavic chronicle „The Chronicle of Bygone Years“ (Povest 
vremennykh let): 
„In the year 852 ... the land of Kievan Rus was first named ... 859: The 
Varangians from beyond the sea imposed a tribute upon the Chuds, the Slavs, the 
Merians, the Ves, and the Krivichians. But the Khazars imposed it upon the 
Polianians, the Severians and the Viatichians, and collected a squirrel-skin and a 
beaver-skin from each hearth. 866-862: The tributaries of the Varangians drove them 
back beyond the sea, and refusing them further tribute, set out to govern themselves. 
There was no law among them, but tribe rose against tribe. Discord thus ensued 
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among them, and they began to war one against the other. They said to themselves, 
„Let us seek a prince who may rule over us, and judge us according to the law.“ They 
accordingly went oversees to the Varangian Russes: these particular Varangians were 
known as Russes, just as some are called Normans, Angles or Goths. The Chuds, the 
Slavs and the Krivichians then said to the people of Rus‘: „Our whole land is great 
and rich, and there is no order it it. Come to rule and reign over us.“ They thus 
selected three brothers, with their kinsfolk, who took with them all the Russes and 
migrated“.27 
As we might later see the brothers later established the whole Rurikid dynasty 
with a capital in Kiev. From the above-mentioned chronicle we can find that Ruriks 
were intelligent and smart rulers, who managed to keep all the tribes under the law. 
The first leaders of Kievan Rus were extremely active on the international arena. 
Their political and military achievements demonstrated the coincidence of political 
and commercial objectives and outcomes. Such foreign policy of the Kievan Rus‘ 
authority caused an open confrontation with Khazaria, the Byzantine, and the steppe 
nomads. 28 Kievan Rus aslo imposed a complex commercially and military oriented 
form of organization, which had to establish a level of unity and order over the tribes. 
Political power of Kievan Rus was centered in the big cities along the major trade 
routs. To support their geopolitical interests and expansionist inspirations, the Rus‘ 
leadership depended at first on tributes, taxations, tariffs on trade, judicial fees and 
fines.29 
The foreign policy of Kievan Rus and its geopolitical instruments were 
strongly integrated with the state’s internal political structure. However, such 
integration together with the inefficience of the state organization system became 
later one of the reasons to future fall of the Kievan Rus.  
For example, the Grand Prince of Kiev did not have a tight centralized 
monarchy, and full control over the military power and the formation of foreign 
policy. These duties were often fell to the rulers of the certain principalities of 
Kievan Rus. Such division of responsibility gave the dynasty full control over its 
political units, but the domestic political structure became more complex and 
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dynastic disputes over the succession became more harmful for the political stability 
in the state and geopolitical arena.30 
During the X-XI century Kiev leaders through the multiple sets of foreign 
relations could establish a large number of contacts with not only Byzantium, but 
also Scandinavia and the rest of Europe. The fame of the dynamic young state 
became so well-known that Metropolitan Hilarion declared Kievan Rus known all 
over the world. It can be also explained, because of its strong merital unions with 
royal houses ranging from France and the Holy Roman Empire to the Byzantium 
itself. For example, the son of the Prince Iziaslav was married to the sister of Polish 
King, Sviatoslav to the sister of the Bishop of Trier, Vsevolod to a member of the 
Byzantium family, Vsevolod Monomakh to an English Princess, and his son wed to 
the daugther of the King of Sweden. The dynasty gained a cosmopolitan character.31 
The acceptance of christianity in 98832 gave an access for Kievan Rus to the 
group of civilized christian countries. The christianity had also became a strong 
instrument in the further protection of own geopolitical interests. Eastern Christianity 
became not only the official religion in the Rus, but a part of big culture of all Slavic 
people. A new-accepted religion brought a literacy to the Rus and had a great 
influence on the cultural aspects of the Kievan geopolitics and the geopolitics of 
future Ukraine.  
As we have previously mentioned there was a serious problem with political 
structure and intradynastic relations. The most serious test for the political unity of 
Kievan Rus and its military strength were the nomads of steppe, whose military 
interventions into the Rus at the end of XI century caused big problems for the 
stability of whole state. The problems to collect revenues from the society, 
intradynastic stuggle for the power and the absence of the centalized monarchy 
caused to the fragmentation of the state into the smaller political units – principalities 
by the end of the XII century.33 
The period of the fragmentation and political disintegration was charaterised 
by the frequency with each the title of Grand Prince was changed hands. For 
example, during  878-1132 years there were 14 Grand Princes, but for the period of 
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the following three decades (1132-1169) 18 Grand Princes ruled the Kievan Rus. 
Those years are usually called as the Era of Rus‘ Desintegration and can be 
characterised as: 
1. The gradual decline of Kiev as political and economic center; 
2. The replacement of power to the other cities and regions of Kievan Rus.34 
Analyzing the above-mentioned facts we can come to conclusion that 
intradynastic disputes and instable domestic and foreign situation lead the decline of 
geopolitical significance of the Kievan Rus. The promissing development of the 
mighty Kievan protostate was also interrupted in the end of XIII century by the 
commercial decline of the main trading partner Byzantium and escpecially the 
Mongol invasion.35  
In our opinion, the period of the Kievan Rus was became one of the most 
significant in the development of Ukrainian foreign policy and the establishment of 
Ukrainian diplomacy to protect geopolitical interests of the state. It can be explained 
in the following facts: 
1. The leadership of Kievan Rus devoloped a multidimensional way of the 
foreign policy, which was called to build economic and political relations 
with the countries of the East and West, North and South. 
2. The significant role of the size and location of the state in the defining of 
geopolitical interests 
The economic, socio-cultural, religious and political factors of the period of 
Kievan Rus reflected the complexity of the geopolitical interests for the future 
Ukrainian state. 
We should understand that the geopolitical situation changed with the Kievan 
Rus‘ disintegration. As the result of fragmentation Kievan Rus was divided on 
Galicia-Volynia, the north of Rus – to the rise of the principality of Suzdal or 
Muscovites, which gave later a birth of current nation Russia (but not a right to steal 
the part of name of Kievan Rus for its future country name), Kiev with few other 
central principalities was occupied by the Golden Horde, the north-western 
principality of Polotsk became the autonomy of Belarus. 
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The last era of  Kievan Rus history on Ukrainian territory was linked to the 
rise of one of its principalities, later the Kingdom, of Galicia-Volhynia (Figure 3). 
Galicia – Volhynia was similar to the rest of Kievan Rus. However, that area had 
some other geopolitical interests in its relations with foreign states. Located in the 
western part of Kievan Rus it was less attacked by the nomadic enemies from the 
East. In the same way Galicia – Volhynia had to build special relations with its 
bordering neighbor countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and later Lithuania.36 
Today we would like to define two important factors, which had an impact on 
the history of geopolitical interests of Galicia – Volhynia: 
1. The demographic factor. It was more densely populated than any other 
parts of Rus. Such fact allowed a fast growth of agriculture with a large 
number of landowning people – boyars. 
2. Galicia-Volhynian princes gave more power to the boyars than their 
colleagues from the Kievan Rus. It created later disruptive consequences 
for the all principality.37 
Stepan Rudnytsky, one of the founders of Ukrainian political and military 
geography, argued: “Twice Galicia played an outstanding role in Ukrainian history: 
the first time was in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, when Ukrainian 
statehood, ruined in the Dnipro region, found shelter in the Galician – Volhynian 
principality; the second time came at the end of the nineteenth century, when the 
Ukrainian cultural movement found shelter beyond the Zbruch river from 
persecution of Russian government”.38 Rudnytsky claimed that although different 
political circumstances had risen between Galician and Eastern Ukrainians, both 
were the same, came from a Kievan Rus and belong to one culture. He supported his 
ideas with the anthropological data and argued that western Ukraine has a unique 
mediating position between the Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary 
from one side, and Central and Eastern Ukraine from another one. This geopolitical 
position, climate, fauna and flora of Western Ukraine together with other factors 
made the medieval Ukraine an important geostrategic country in the region.39 
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Medieval Galicia – Volhynia played an important role in the history of 
Ukraine, because it was one of those principalities, where the original culture of Kiev 
was preserved (something much different than Muscovy, which arose from one of 
the Kievan Rus’ principalities – the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal). Galicia – 
Volyhnia preserved the best traditions of Ukrainian foreign policy and geopolitics at 
first independently, then within the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, until it was 
carried on during the period of Ukrainian history – the Cossack era.40 
In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ukrainian orthodox elite were 
pressured to adapt the Catholicism and its traditions. In the same way some parts of 
Western Ukraine were occupied by the polish magnates. That is why, starting from 
the XVI century, the Ukrainian Cossacks began to emerge a significant military force 
against the polish state.  The Ukrainian Cossacks established an autonomous 
stronghold - Zaporizhian Sich on the lower of Dniepro or Zaporozhya.41 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a prominent Ukrainian academician, historian, 
politician and statesman, in his preface to the seventh volume of his History 
described the geopolitical attempts of the Cossacks: “It was the first time in historical 
memory, the Ukrainian nation came forth actively as the architect of its own destiny 
and life, rising to a life-or-death struggle for the realization of its dreams and 
desires.”42 
In the beginning of the XVII century the leader of the Cossack era Petro 
Sahaidachny put the development of the Ukrainian orthodox traditions inherited from 
Kievan Rus on a new level. Kiev became again the center of culture and education.43 
The Ukrainian Cossack State, which existed between the XV and XVII 
centuries, significantly influenced on the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe. 
Due to its unique central location Cossack State had to deal with difficult geopolitical 
processes in the region and build the relations with other geopolitical players such as 
Muscovia, Ottoman Empire, Sweden, Valachia, Transylvania, Crimean Khanate and 
Poland.  
The geopolitical interests of Cossack State were rapidly developing and 
changing due to the dynamic changes in the region. At first, Cossacks, who were 
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pressured from the side of the polish state, decided to launch a military uprising 
against the poles. That is why, in 1648 a new leader hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky 
signed a military-political union with the Muscovite state in Pereyaslav in 1654. 
However, Muscovia not only broke that agreement, but also gave up the interests of 
Cossacks to the poles in 1667 by signing Andrusov Treaty. As result the Cossack 
State was divided for the Left-bank and Right-bank parts. In this case, the national 
geopolitical strategy was dramatically changed.  In the same way, the main task 
remained the same to establish an independent united state on the ethnically 
Ukrainian territories. It was possible only with a cardinal change of the geopolitical 
situation in Europe. Ukrainian Cossacks were forced to establish new ties with 
potential allies. Ukrainian hetman Petro Doroshenko understood such situation and 
established such Union with Ottoman Empire to combat with the Muscovites and the 
poles. After heavy battle the attempt to establish a new unified Cossack state failed. 
The following attempt to throw off the Muscovites domination was made under the 
leadership of Ivan Mazepa and his ally Swedish King Charles XII, also ended a with 
a failure.44  
As a result of the long-lasting exhausting battles, the betrayals of allies, 
decline of national spirit among Ukrainians and the geopolitical loss of all Europe in 
the Great Northern War during the 1720-1721 years lead to the annexing of most of 
Ukrainian territories by the Russian Empire (except Galicia, which was under the 
Austrian control).45 
In our opinion, the problems of reaching the geopolitical interests of the 
Cossack state were related to the problem of choosing allies. For example, the 
political-military union with the Muscovia in 1654 became later the end of the 
independent foreign policy and diplomacy of the Ukrainian Cossack state. 
Muscovian (Russian) tsarist leadership did not only give up the interests of Ukraine 
to the poles, but under the fear of separatism extremely restricted the development of 
Ukrainian independent state, history, culture and language. 
Similarly to other empires Moscow regime used cruel, violent administrative 
methods to govern controlled territories and prevent any trials of separatism. 
However, such policy had rather opposite effect – it developed a strong desire to 
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preserve national ethnic characteristics and form new Ukrainian political elite, who 
would fight for a defense of national geopolitical interests in the close future. 
The next important stage in the development of Ukrainian geopolitical 
thought can be referred to the mid of XIX century. In 1847 the first modern 
Ukrainian political organization the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius was 
established in Kiev to promote the equal democratic ideas among the Slavic peoples 
and opposed Russian autocracy.46 In 1900 a society of young Ukrainian found the 
first political organization – the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) to give the 
Ukrainian movement for independence a political expression. This party gave a start 
for the future Ukrainian party’s development in the XX century.47 
 However, the World War I, which occurred in 1914, extremely changed the 
geopolitical situation not only for Ukrainian people, but for the entire world.  As we 
know the open confrontation between two hostile blocks – The Entente and the 
Triple Alliance or the Central Powers for economic and military domination became 
a main reason of the War. Both blocks had a strong desire to annex new territories 
and expand influence in the world.  
 Ukraine as non-independent geopolitical actor could not facilitate own 
foreign policy and was seen as a controlled part of Russian Empire. However, some 
countries like Germany had specific plans about Ukraine. Germany planned to annex 
Ukraine together with Poland, Baltic States, Caucasus and other states to become the 
mightiest empire in the world. In the same way, Russian Empire wanted to annex 
Western part of Ukraine (Galicia) from Austro-Hungarian Empire (Figure 4).  
In our opinion the period of the World War I had a significant impact on the 
formation of Ukrainian geopolitics, because of the following reasons: 
1. Due to its geopolitical location Ukrainian territories became the main 
battleground between the Russian Empire and Germany. It was resulted in the 
enormous human losses and decrease in the economic development.  
2. Ukrainian population was divided on two parts: Galicians, who supported 
the Habsburg Empire, and the rest of Ukraine, who were anti-Central Power 
supporters. 
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3. The growth of national consciousness among Ukrainians and the raise of 
“Ukrainian question” on the international level were opposed to increasing 
contradictions in the Russian Empire and the revolutionary inspirations 
among people. 
4. October Revolution of 1917, which symbolized the end of tsarist Russian 
Empire, and the following uprisings in Ukraine gave a chance to create an 
independent Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917 (Figure 5), which was 
renamed as Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919. 
The geopolitical and socio-cultural consequences of the World War I were 
more than just monumental. The end of German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires brought a new political order on the map of Europe. In this case, 
Ukrainian leadership had to react on those changes and reorient their interests 
according to a new world’s geopolitical situation. The development of geopolitics of 
Ukraine as a founding member of the Soviet Union we will discuss in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
2.2.The geopolitics of Ukraine in the Soviet era 
After the break-up of the tsarist Russian Empire, a new-established Ukrainian 
government wanted to build multi-vector policy in the sphere of international 
relations pointed on the international recognition of Ukraine’s independence. A large 
number of diplomatic contacts with such countries as Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Switzerland, Poland, Finland, Sweden, were established since 
1917. Ukraine actively participated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918, where 
affirmed own independence, signed numerous treaties with other states and 
conducted foreign policy according to the national interests.48  
In the same way Ukrainian leadership understood that geopolitical location of 
Ukraine, common history, culture and religion with the Soviet Russia made both of 
those states close in the foreign policy. Ukrainian Deputy People’s Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs Mr. Yakovlev stated on August 1922 about the geopolitical interests: 
“Ukrainian diplomacy focuses on obtaining of the new government and establishing 
commercial relations with following countries – Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, 
Italy, and newly established Baltic States… In the same way Ukraine can not have 
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any interests other than in common with Russia… The heroic struggle of Russia, in 
complete Alliance with Ukraine on all fronts against imperialists is now giving place 
to an equally united diplomatic front”.49 
The experience of the World War I and the threat of possible future wars 
forced Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to think about the formation of a military 
union with the Soviet Russia. Such Union was established between Ukraine and 
Russia to prevent any foreign interventions in 1919. Such countries as Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Armenia joined Alliance in 1920-1921.50 
In the same time Moscow understood Ukraine’s geopolitical importance and 
sought the ways for closer cooperation. It could be explained for the following 
reasons: Ukraine was the only European state, which bordered with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Ukrainian shorelines on the Black Sea could provide 
an easy access for Soviets to the international waters; By 1917 Ukraine had a 
population comparatively to that of France or Italy. Ukraine was the second most 
populous state within Russian Empire; Finally, Soviet Russia needed Ukraine 
because of its huge agricultural potential, mineral deposits and industrial power.51 
The need to expand cooperation between two countries was met by Soviet 
Ukrainian government. Such newly-established Soviet states as Byelorussia and the 
Transcaucasian Federation also supported not only military, but also economic and 
political cooperation within a region. That is why, after the series of negotiations and 
other unification processes Ukraine as a founding member together with Russia, 
Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation agreed to establish a Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 1922.52 
We should understand that development of geopolitics in the USSR differed 
from the development of geopolitics in the other countries. The Soviet leadership 
tried to forbid the formation of geopolitics, which was considered to be the element 
of Western capitalist civilization.  
However, the period of the first years of Soviet era had a great influence on 
the development of geopolitics in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine has received great 
benefits during the first years in the USSR. The New Economic Policy of 1922 gave 
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a big chance to rebuild the national economy damaged after the World War I. 
Ukrainian language and culture was widely promoted and recognized (which was 
forbidden under the tsars). That period was named as “Golden Age” for Ukrainian 
writers such as Mykola Khvylovy and Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, but also for 
hundreds of Ukrainians, who supported an idea of “Ukrainization”, a national idea to 
promote Ukrainian interests in all aspects.53 
 The idea of national economy had to become a base for the future Ukrainian 
geopolitics. Protected national economy could help the development of regionally 
and socially limited base of Ukrainian culturalism and build the social infrastructure 
of Ukrainian economy. The ideas of a natural national “economic space” might be 
found in the works of famous Ukrainian geopoliticians Stepan Rudnytsky and Yuriy 
Lypa, who claimed that Ukrainian natural economy had two goals. First, it helped to 
set the image of common Ukraine’s interests over the ethno-linguistic and regional 
differences. Second, it provided a better understanding of a myth of prosperity via 
autonomy. 54 Stepan Rudnytsky and Yuriy Lypa argued that “Russian raw material 
and energy supply imposed unnatural diseconomies of scale on Ukraine, while 
exporting to Russia cut Ukraine off from geographically more proximate markets 
with lower transport costs. In short, welfare gains were predicted to accrue fairly 
rapidly after independence.”55 
 The other famous Ukrainian academician Antin Synyavsky focused his 
geopolitical research on geoeconomic problems of Ukraine. The professor Sinyavsky 
was actively involved in the development of Ukrainian geopolitical strategy in the 
sphere of economics. Speaking about the geopolitical role of Ukraine, he notes: "The 
transit route to the Mediterranean, India and the Far East goes through Ukraine."56  
A. Sinyavsky defined Ukraine's cooperation with the countries of the Middle East as 
strategically important. That region could become a big market for Ukrainian goods. 
Professor Sinyavsky became later a “father” of methodology of the Ukrainian 
economic geography. His economic theory of zoning became one of the 
first national geopolitical concepts. Antin Sinyavsky spend much attention 
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on studying of the world economy, which he considered as not a group 
of national economic systems of individual countries, but the complicated 
interconnected system.57 We should mention that Antin Sinyavsky became one of the 
most prominent Ukrainian geopoliticians in the interwar period. 
During the 1920s Ukrainian leaders of geopolitical thought were divided in 
two schools – statist and populist. Vyacheslav Lypynsky, a father of the statist 
school, rejected the ideas of populism and claimed than only some “mystical ideal” 
can motivate the masses to heroic exploits. In this case, the masses have to be led by 
the aristocracy. Lypynsky, saw societies going through three stages – the first, 
ochlocracy or social underdevelopment, the second – classocracy or high organic 
development, and the third is democracy or decline. Lypynsky supported an idea of 
the third stage ignoring its negative effect. He believed that there could be no state 
without nation. The base of Ukrainian state must be territorial, not ethnic or 
religious.58  
 The ideas of Lypynsky were highly criticized for his single-minded insistence 
on the importance of the statehood for the development of Ukrainian nation. For 
example, Stepan Tomashivsky argued that statehood could not be the final goal for 
the national movement. Tomashivsky stressed on the fact that state it would be better 
for Ukrainians to stop pursuing the ideal of statehood, but develop the characteristic 
of modern nation.59 
 Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the first Ukrainian president in 1918, one of the most 
prominent figures of Ukrainian national revival of the early XX century, a 
representative of populist school generally put the interests of masses at the top of 
agenda. However, Hrushevsky argued that confrontation between statists and 
populists was not about the issue of the statehood, but what kind of state they wanted 
to build. Lypynsky, Tomashevsky, Doroshenko, Krevetsky, and others rejected the 
idea of Hrushevsky about the orientation on masses: they stressed on the role of 
elites in Ukrainian history. In this case, we may conclude that confrontation was not 
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only between the statism and populism, but also elitism and anti-elitism or 
egatalitarism.60 
The death of Soviet leader Lenin in 1924 had an extremely negative effect on 
the development of Ukrainian geopolitical thought. The new leader Joseph Stalin had 
plans different from the previous administration. To keep stricter control on the parts 
of Soviet Union, including Ukraine was a main goal of the future dictator. During the 
1920s the thousands of university teachers, thinkers, writers, students, Orthodox 
Church clergy and many others intellectuals or intelligentsia, who supported an idea 
of independent Ukraine were accused of trying to overturn Communist revolution 
and sent into exile in Siberia. Stalin also rejected any idea of national Ukrainian 
economic space by his ambitious plan to make the rural Soviet Union into the 
leading industrial power. During the 1920-1930s years many factories and mines 
were built in Ukraine. However, the widespread industrialization together with 
forced collectivization of the farms (giving up the private farms to the state-own 
collectives or kolkhozy lead to the uprising among Ukrainian farmers. To punish the 
farmers once and for all Joseph Stalin seized with force crop from the agricultural 
population and later sent the thousands of Soviet troops to strip the Soviet rural area 
of food. The result was shocking: more than 5 millions of Ukrainians starved to death 
in a massive man-made famine during the 1932-1933 years.61 
The era of Great Terror by Stalin brought not only forced industrialization, 
collectivization, murders of people, who did not supported the communist ideology, 
but also increasing centralization of power in Moscow with the following destruction 
of all aspects of autonomy for Ukraine and its national interests. The number of 
intellectuals, philosophers, scholars and writers, including Serhiy Efremov, 
Volodymyr Chekhivsky, Andriy Nikovsky, Osyp Hermaize, Mykailo Slabchenko, 
Hryhoriy Holoskevych, and Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska were accused for 
the participation in the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, which supported the 
separation of Ukraine from the USSR, resistance of collectivization and assassination 
of Stalin. The organizations such as Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Church, Agricultural Academy, all-Ukrainian newspapers and 
magazines, and many other cultural, educational, scientific and religious institutions 
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were totally destructed by political police NKVD. Ukrainian geopolitical ideology 
had a little chance for its development until Stalin was alive.62 
However, some of Ukrainian geopoliticians still continued writing of their 
works. For example, a famous Ukrainian political scientist, Yuriy Lypa published 
geopolitical works “Pryznachennia Ukrainy” [The Destiny of Ukraine] in 1938 and 
“Chornomorska Doktryna” [The Black Sea Doctrine]” in 1940, where he described 
Black Sea doctrine of Ukraine and Ukrainian perspectives as a leader of the Black 
sea. Yuriy Lypa was one of the few researchers, who believed, that the main axis for 
Ukraine should be North-South, but now East-West. In his book “Pryznachennia 
Ukrainy”, the famous geopolitician defined the national idea of Ukraine and its place 
and role in the world’s history, and developed an idea of so-called “Ukrainian 
socialism”.63 Yuriy Lypa also stressed on the importance of territory and the main 
rivers of Ukraine in the development of its geopolitics: “The river network of 
Ukraine creates the unity of territory, its trade, government, traditions, culture and 
religion”.64  
 As we have mentioned in the previous paragraphs Stalin’s era was a very 
difficult time not only for the development of independent geopolitical thought, but 
also for all Soviet people. The actual reestablishment of independent Ukrainian 
geopolitical interests was recovered only after the end of World War II 1945 and the 
death of Stalin in 1953. The post-war period was remarkable in the sense of 
geopolitics. Ukraine returned its historical borders, grew its political and economic 
significance within the Soviet Union, for the first time in the last centuries 
Ukrainians received one, non-divided, single state. Historical lands of Western 
Ukraine were turned back from the polish state to Ukraine at Yalta conference in 
1945, the Bessarabian districts of Northern Bukovina and Ismail (from Romania) and 
Transcarpathian Ruthian (from Czechoslovakia).65  
Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became a new 
leader of the USSR. Khrushchev, who was the First Secretary of the Ukrainian SSR 
during 1938-1949, knew the problems of Ukraine and actively supported its interests. 
Under leadership of Khrushchev, the Crimean peninsula (26 000 sq. km.) was 
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transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. It made Ukraine the largest contiguous 
country on the European continent (Figure 6).66 
 The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was a big geopolitical shift in the relations 
between Russia and Ukraine. However, such “gift” was not so altruistic than it 
seemed. The first, historically the Crimean peninsula was a homeland for Crimean 
Tatars, who were expelled by Stalin during the World War II. That is why, Russians 
did not have a moral right to accept that territory. The second, the Crimean peninsula 
was naturally closer and economically dependant on Ukraine. The third reason, 
which is widely discussed by the modern Ukrainian geopoliticians, was to pass to 
Kiev a right to solve all that economic and political chaos, which happened after the 
deportations of Tatars in 1944.67  
The Khrushchev’s era or the period of de-Stalinization is often called in the 
history of Ukraine as “Thaw”, because it marked a new level in the development of 
Ukrainian economy, culture and politics.  Ukrainian intelligence received a 
permission to publish own journals, magazines and dictionaries in the fields of 
history, language, geography and culture. At the same time Ukrainian scholarship did 
not concentrate only on the traditional humanities, but also developed modern areas 
of knowledge such as cybernetics, space engineering and nuclear research. In 1957 
the first computer center was established in Kiev, later transformed in the Institute of 
cybernetics in 1962. The development of the above-mentioned fields of science made 
Ukraine a leader within the USSR. It was quite important for the redefining of 
national geopolitical interests in the close future.68 
In the 1950s Ukrainian leadership understood the importance of 
multidimensional foreign policy. Ukraine played the important role in the rebuilding 
of post-War world and establishment of the United Nations organization. We should 
mention that Ukraine, even while a Union republic, has received an exclusive right 
from the Soviet Union to be as a separate independent republic a full founding 
member of the UN in 1949, where Ukraine joined several specialized agencies and 
signed a plenty of the agreements and treaties related to the UN activities. Ukraine 
had joined other international and regional organizations, where mostly the Soviet 
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Union as a union was also a member. That fact was widely recognized by the foreign 
states. Such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria 
Yugoslavia, Cuba, India, Egypt, and others launched their consulates in Kiev or 
Odessa by the mid of 1970s.69 
Since the end of 1950s of the XX century Ukrainian foreign policy focused 
on the promotion of peace and security of peoples, the peaceful coexistence of 
independent sovereign countries and respect of the right for self-proclamation among 
all nations.  Such intensions and active work within the United Nations were resulted 
in the establishment of the permanent representation of the Ukrainian SSR in the UN 
in 1957. As a member of the UN the republic paid a significant attention to the 
problems of post-wars outcomes. At the XII session of the UN General Assembly in 
October, 1957 the Chairman of Ukrainian delegation Mr. Palamarchuk claimed about 
the problem of disarmament – complete ban of nuclear and hydrogen weapon and 
reduction of the armed forces would prevent the possibility of future wars.70 
Analyzing the socio-cultural life of Soviet Ukraine we should mention in the 
late of 1950s and early 1960s Ukraine felt some cultural renaissance, but political 
repressions still occurred. On the one hand many writers and academicians were 
rehabilitated, new Ukrainian journals and newspapers were launched, but on the 
other hand, Ukrainian KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [Committee for 
State Security]) continued its persecutions. The response of Soviet authority on such 
freedom inspirations was quick. A new doctrine of slianie (the blending of the 
nationalities within the USSR into one Soviet people) was launched to deflect anti-
Russian mood of Ukrainian nationalists. The number of members of the United Party 
for the Liberation of Ukraine were arrested and sentenced. The Ukrainian Church 
was also forbidden. For example, the historic heart of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the Kiev 
Pecherska Lavra monastery was declared as unsafe and closed. The archbishop of 
Chernihov and many others were sentenced to the prisons. The political arrests and 
persecutions forced Ukrainian intelligence to immigrate to the other countries and 
continue its work abroad during 1960s-1970s. Plenty of Ukrainian newspapers, 
schools, non-profit scientific and cultural organizations were launched in the other 
                                                          
69
 James P. Nichol, Diplomacy in the former Soviet Republics, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995,  
p. 92. 
70
„ Ukraina v systemi mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn [Geopolitics Ukraine in the system of international 
relations]“, SLV.com.ua. Available at:  http://slv.com.ua/bookz/183/6460.html (Assessed on March, 
11, 2011) 
 44 
states, such as Canada, Austria, USA, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Czechoslovakia 
and others.71 The persecution of religious and other secular activists (Josyp Terelya, 
Vasyl Kobryn, Volodymyr Brovchenko, Dmytro Pavlychko, Borys Oliynyk, Lina 
Kostenko and many others) continued in the late 1970s.72  
The last years of Khrushchev and the early years of Brezhnev, the following 
Soviet leader, were characterized as the negative environment for the development of 
Ukrainian geopolitics. The increasing activity of Ukrainian political scientists, who 
supported an idea of sovereign independent Ukrainian state, was met by the Soviet 
leaderships as a danger. The Soviet state policy of slianie did not allow recognition 
of any other nationality or state than the USSR. 
The Brezhnev’s neo-Stalinism did not have such negative effect on Ukraine, 
as original Stalinism did. However, the geopolitical situation of Ukraine had faced 
with some changes. The first, Brezhnev’s constitution of 1977 declared that the 
USSR is a socialist state of the whole people, not only the workers and peasants, but 
also and intelligentsia. It respected the rights of all the nations and nationalities 
within a country. The right of Soviet republics to secede from the Union played later 
an important role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.73  
The other, Ukrainian dissidents still failed to unify around one national idea. 
Drawing on its historic roots, Ukrainian intelligence was divided on two distinct 
orientations: the first, identified with its leader Dziuba, challenged Moscow’s 
political and economic policies as a violation of “Lenin standards”, which were 
declared in the moment of the Soviet Union’s formation, and the second, led by 
Valentyn Moroz, drew on the violent pro-Moscow integralist ideology. The two 
orientations, national communists and neo-integral nationalists, did not assist the 
establishment of national idea, but ideologically divided Ukraine. The famous 
Ukrainian geopoliticians Stepan Rudnytsky claimed that those orientations 
represented the two authoritarian traditions in the history of Ukraine during the 
Soviet era.74  
Overall, by the mid of 1980s Ukraine existed as a territorial-administrative 
unit with a modern society, its political elite and institutional organization. The 
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increasing anti-Moscow reactions were even intensified under the new policy of open 
public space and perestroika (restructuring) initiated by Mikahil Gorbachev in 1985. 
Gorbachev understood the strong need in the modern reforms of political and 
economic structure of the USSR. The reforms were also referred to the cultural life in 
the Union. The number of nationalist informal groups, led by dissidents who were 
released from the Soviet prisons, extremely increased. Most of those organizations 
appealed Gorbachev to speed up the reforms in Ukraine. For example, The Popular 
Movement for Perestroika (Rukh) was established in 1989 to call for the reforms and 
revival of Ukrainian language and culture. The movement created an unprecedented 
mass political awaking and mobilization among all Ukrainian people.75 
The raise of political mobilization and national identity among Ukrainians 
and other peoples, an absence of effective economic and political reform within the 
USSR and the geopolitical shifts in Europe at the end of XX century provoked the 
stagnation of the Soviet Union. As a result the history of Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics closed to the end. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus signed Belavezha Accords, 
which declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine has also 
received a unique chance to build the new geopolitics, which would respond the 
national interests of an independent European state. 
 
2.3.The formation of a new geopolitical thought in Ukraine 
For much of the world Ukraine as a state appeared in 1991 after the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. In fact Ukraine has been for millennia on the lands where it is. 
A new date declaration of independence in 1991 was only another successful trial of 
local elite to regain a political control of its territory. In 1995 the US President Bill 
Clinton mentioned that a new democratic state Ukraine was in the same way one of 
the Europe’s oldest nations.76 
By regaining a control over own foreign policy Ukraine caused major 
changes in the system of international relations. The actions of Ukrainians, who 
voted for a domestic independence, had a far-reaching influence on the future 
geopolitical shifts. American analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski named Ukrainian 
declaration of independence as “One of the three most important geopolitical 
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development of the XX century  ... The other two were the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the 1945 division of Europe on two blocks.”77 
 Canadian specialist on the former Soviet Union Dr. Marta Dyczok wrote: 
“Ukrainian declaration of independence became the Soviet Union’s death certificate. 
Without Ukraine, Russia could not maintain control over the other Republics, its 
direct influence pushed back into its own boundaries.”78 Ukraine was a heartland, the 
home of several key industries and the breadbasket for all the Soviet Union, the 
nurturing place for many Soviet leaders: Kaganovich, Khruschev (born near Kursk, 
but lived and died in Ukraine), Brezhnev, Shcherbytsky, and others. Ukraine was one 
of four founding members of the USSR and one of three (including Russia and 
Belorus), who signed Belavezha Accords, which declared the final dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian capital Kiev was respected by many Russians as the 
integral part of the birth of their history and the center of the medieval principality of 
Kievan Rus.79 
 Ukraine chose own path since gaining own independence. The foreign 
policies of two presidents (Leonid Kravchuk 1991-1994, and Leonid Kuchma, 1994-
2005) declared “Returning to Europe” as the main geostrategic course in the national 
foreign policy. This course included the close interaction between the domestic 
reforms, national identity, and foreign policy orientation. Another policy, set by the 
political elites under the Kuchma’s leadership in 1994, was called as the 
“Cooperation independence”. That policy allowed Ukraine to normalize the strategic 
relations with Russian Federation and other neighbor countries, maintain the 
relations with the Eurasian states, but in the same time to continue its “returning to 
Europe”. Such policy had to endure the West to support Ukrainian economic and 
political reforms, convince the partners in the stability and security of the state.80 
 Confirming the status of the peaceful European state Ukraine declared its new 
geopolitical model and its non-nuclear position. On that time Ukraine was the third 
largest nuclear power in the world (after the USA and Russia, but before China). 
Ukraine possessed a nuclear potential, in the total of 176 SS-19 and SS-24 
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intercontinental ballistic missiles (1240 warheads), 44 strategic bombers and 
unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads on its territory.81  
It is an interesting fact that most of those missiles were targetted on the 
United States. It was explained by the hostile relations between the USA and USSR 
during the Cold War and geostrategic location of nuclear arsenal in the European part 
of the Soviet Union. That is why, the USA seriously concerned about the nuclear 
status of Ukraine and actively supported its non-nuclear position. The US Secretary 
of Defence William J. Perry decribed a nuclear arsenal of Ukraine as „the single 
biggest threat to international peace and security that we face everywhere in the 
world“82. Today we may only wonder how Americans could describe their own 
nuclear potential and regular „human interventions“ into the other parts of the world 
to protect democracy. 
 Anyways Ukraine signed and ratified the Treaty on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offencive Armes (START I) and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to confirm its non-nuclear status in 1994.83 
 Ukrainian goverment understood that denuclearization required additional 
security guarantees from the global powers. After the long process of negotiations 
Ukraine received these assurances from the US and Russian presidents at the CSCE 
meeting in Budapest on December, 1994. The Budapest Security Assurances 
included the security and economic assurances from Russia and USA. In additition 
other nuclear states such as the Great Britain, China and France also provided the 
same assurances about Ukrainian security.84 Ukraine has received a chance for 
democratic development in a new status – status of peaceful non-nuclear European 
state. 
 However, modern Ukrainian geopoliticians differently evaluate the desire of 
Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal. Some of them think that it was a big mistake 
to declare its non-nuclear status. The current anarchic system of international 
relations is not always based on the principals of international law. The security 
assurances received by Ukraine from the worlds power can not provide the feeling of 
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full security and stability. In addition, the nuclear potential could make Ukraine not 
the regional, but a global power in the close future. The status of global power could 
help Ukraine to confirm its non-alliance status and receive an effective to tool to 
protect its geopolitical interests. Other group of political scientists think, that the 
nuclear status is a big responsibility and threat to the security situation in Europe. 
Ukraine as the state, which declared the democratic way of development and its 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has a chance to become the stable and strategic partner in 
the eyes of West, but not a hostile country of the former Soviet Union. 
 However, we personally think that Ukraine had to keep and develop its 
nuclear potential as the effective instrument of national geopolitics. The nuclear 
potential would make regional states to respect Ukrainian national interests and help 
to build exclusively mutual geostrategic relations with the countries of NATO and 
European Union. That is why, we have a stong interest that nuclear program of 
Ukraine will be renewed in the close future. 
At the same time we are sure that Ukrainian integration to the Euro-Atlantic 
structures would shift the geostrategic balance of Europe, ending the imperial 
ambitions of Russian Federation to create the “Slavic Union” together with Ukraine 
and few other states of the former USSR. Such Union could restore the Soviet 
hegemony on the continent and threaten the security and stability in the region. 
However, as Zbigniew Brzenzinski argued that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be 
a European power.85  
Ukrainian geopolitics started to develop separately from Russia after the 
Orange revolution. For Russia the Orange revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was much 
more serious threat than the Rose revolution in Georgia. Ukrainian Orange 
revolution inspired hope both in Ukraine and the West that Ukraine had chose the 
course of Western integration in the democratic development of state. Ukrainian 
revolution did not give so quick effect that it happened in other post-communist 
states. Personal rivalries between the two main leaders of the Orange revolution – the 
President Viktor Yushchenko and the Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko negatively 
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influenced on the implementation of reforms and closer integration into the Euro-
Atlantic institutions.86 
However, we personally believe the Orange revolution had positive rather 
than negative effect. The first, Ukrainian people were united around one national 
idea – better future for own country. The second, Ukraine as one of the largest 
European democracies confirmed its democratic status in the eyes of Western world. 
The negative outcome of revolution is only one – the leaders of Orange revolution 
Viktor Yuschchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko appeared to be a great disappointment 
in the eyes of millions of Ukrainians, who supported them. In the struggle for the 
power the leaders forgot about the supporters and did not implement the promised 
reforms. 
Geographically and culturally Ukraine belongs to the European civilization.  
That is why, today Ukraine has to develop the strategy, which would respond the 
geopolitical potential of Ukraine as a Central European state. Historically, the parts 
of Ukrainian land developed within other countries such as the Moscow Empire, 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland or Germany. However, today as an independent 
state, Ukraine has received a chance to build a fundamentally new geopolitics for the 
successful development of the Ukrainian people. The current formation of Ukrainian 
geopolitics requires a taking into account the combined system of geopolitical 
interests of other democratic civilized states, their experience and geopolitical 
concepts to develop own national strategy.87 
We should admit that many researchers work on the development of the most 
optimal geopolitical strategy for Ukraine. However, the process to find an “ideal” 
model of Ukrainian geopolitics is quite complicated and long-lasting. The cultural, 
historical, geographical, economic and other factors influence the modern 
geostrategy of Ukraine. Analyzing these factors the government-based the National 
Institute for Strategic Studies (Kiev, Ukraine) in the report “Ukraine in Core of 
Geopolitical Outlines” defines such main paradigms as “Eurasian (Russia and the 
CIS) paradigm, the Euro-Atlantic (European) paradigm and the South-Eastern 
paradigm... All of them have sufficiently deep historical roots and are determined by 
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a number of geopolitical factors. This attests to their objectivity and importance for 
the existence of the state. They are traditional for political life of Ukraine… The 
strategic choice of partners was the first step of Ukraine was forced to do each time it 
has obtained the possibility of going its own way. With the regaining of 
independence Ukraine must once again express itself in this sphere. Public sentiment 
is torn in a severe struggle between the proponents of western and north-eastern 
directions for Ukraine. The identification of Ukraine's national interest in this issue 
constitutes a strategic choice, one that will influence the fate of the country for 
decades to come. In our opinion, the geopolitical situation of Ukraine demands the 
creation of a balanced system of neighborly relations.”88 
Analyzing these paradigms due to the terms of classical geopolitics Eurasian 
model is based on the “tellurocratic principle”.89 According to Karl Schmidtt’s 
element theory the geopolitical cultural dualism is divided on two civilization types: 
talassocracy and tellurocracy. Schmidtt argues that geopoliticians make a significant 
error by the reducing the difference between the types of civilizations to differences 
in the geopolitical characteristics of given locality. Due to the tellurocracy, which is 
reflected in the basic principle of Eurasian model of Ukrainian geopolitics, states are 
defined as “the inner-continental civilizations, which are regarded as a “stationary 
platform," "heartland," or "geographical axis of history," in that they remain stable 
and immobile in history. Meanwhile, civilizations of the former type, the coastal 
zones of the Eurasian mainland, are zones of intensive cultural development. For 
tellurocracy the main thing is not values but ideas being part of a solid ideology and 
the latter playing a system-forming role... Ideas and ideologies are the key elements 
of the Eurasian civilization whose geopolitical space is connected with Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.“90 
The second paradigm of Ukrainian geostrategic model is Euro-Atlantic based 
on the talassocracy. The main values of talassocracy are marine power, the right to 
live, market relations, individual initiative and ethical flexibility. The values are 
foxused on the life strategies to prove on the positive individual development. The 
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modern processes in Ukraine could be described as the movement towards a 
talassocratic civilization. By choosing talassocracy Ukraine simply renews its age-
old historical status, which starts at the period of Kievan Rus.  For Ukraine this 
choice is natural; it wants to regain its historical memory, the period when Ukrainian 
nation existed long before the Muscovy and the Slavic unions, the period of Kievan 
Rus. The culture of Kyiv Rus was talassocratic. The state with its powerful 
geopolitical influence lived for the centuries and developed ideas of individualism, 
enterprising spirit, possession of individual values, and introduction of law system. 
The identification of Kievan Rus as a talassocratic state is also explained by the 
development its maritime influence and strong influence of its strategic partners 
Greece and the Byzantine Empire. That is why, the Crimea peninsula and the access 
to the Black and Asov Sea is important for Ukraine not only in the geopolitical sense, 
but also cultural aspects.91 
The last third paradigm of Ukrainian geostrategy, defined by the National 
Institute for Strategic Studies, is called South-Eastern. This model is characterized by 
its historical connections with the states of South-East. It also applies the principle of 
the frontier, the seashore line, the geopolitical location of Ukraine on the crossroads 
between Europe and Asia.92 
 In my opinion all the above-mentioned paradigms have the right for 
existence. However I would not say that country has to follow only one of these 
concepts. Each may provide Ukraine a chance to develop the mutually beneficial 
cooperative relations with other regional states. That is why, we think that the “ideal” 
version for Ukrainian geopolitics would be the harmonious combination of all these 
paradigms into one complex national doctrine. Before we conclude with our version 
of the most optimal model of Ukrainian I think we should summarize the core 
geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the modern era. The role of interest in the 
formation of national geopolitics we explored in the first chapter of our thesis. The 
report of the National Institute for Strategic Studies “Ukraine in Core Geopolitical 
Outlines“ includes the following geopolitical priorities of Ukraine: 
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• To provide the protection of Ukraine as a sovereign independent state; to 
assist the strengthening of the fundamental values, rights and freedoms to 
ensure stability, welfare, security and socio-cultural progress through the 
international cooperation; 
• To conduct the policy pointed on Ukraine’s “Return to Europe” through the 
integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, social structures and 
security structures; 
• To strengthen the economic, political and military potential of Ukraine 
through the intensification of domestic development, cooperation with other 
states within the framework of European security structures, conclusion of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties; 
• To orient toward more closer integration into the European Union and the 
Western European Union; the comprehensive partnership with NATO, 
including the future possible membership in the political structures of this 
organization 
• To build the strategic partnership with the USA and other western European 
countries in correspondence with national interests and priorities of Ukraine; 
• To develop equal and mutually beneficial economic, political and socio-
cultural relations with the Russian Federation and other states of former 
Soviet Union; 
• To consolidate the special relations with strategically important neighbors, 
such as the Baltic states, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and states of the 
Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary); 
• To form mutually beneficial relations with the countries of North and South 
America, Asia, Africa and the Pacific region. 
• To support the activities of Ukrainian Diaspora; to establish Ukrainian 
cultural, educational, scientific, economic and political centers abroad  to 
extend the history, culture, language and other information about Ukraine; 
• To assist the formation of so-called "stability belt" from the Baltic and Black 
Seas to the Caucasus and Central Asia through the active participations in the 
regional and global security, organizations; 
• To participate in the development of the following “transportation corridors”, 
which would link Europe and Eurasia, the "Baltic - Black Sea - Middle East",  
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the "Western Europe - Ukraine - the Transcaucasian - Central Asia - China" 
for the supply of energy and other strategically important resources; to 
modernize the national transportation system; 
• To continue the course toward alternative leadership within the territories of 
the former Soviet Union; cooperation with those states that regard Ukraine as 
a reliable, equal partner, free of superpower and hegemonic ambitions; 
• To prevent the attempts of any foreign socio-cultural and informational 
domination over the national culture and informational sphere; 
• To develop all the pre-conditions for the development consistent national 
strategy that could react on new geopolitical and foreign policy interests, 
global challenges and the problems;93 
As we can see from the report Ukraine has a wide spectrum of geopolitical 
interests. The unique geographical location on the border or European and Eurasian 
civilizations opened for Ukraine the possibility for maneuver in the foreign policy. 
However, to achieve the ideal model for national geopolitics Ukraine has to develop 
its own multi-dimensional, pragmatic and non-aligned policy. Ukraine should closely 
cooperate with Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also build mutually beneficial relations 
with its neighboring states including Russia. The uniting role of mediator in the 
relations between the Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Baltic 
regions would be an ideal version for Ukrainian policy-makers. Except it, the active 
participation in the work of regional and global organizations will assist Ukraine to 
protect its national interests. 
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3. The geopolitical position of Ukraine in a modern era: the relations 
with strategic partners 
Due to its unique geopolitical location between the Slavic Eurasia and 
Western Europe Ukraine has a wide range of geopolitical interests not only within a 
region, but also outside this region. The main principles on which Ukraine develops 
its own foreign policy based on the respect of international law, the UN Charter, the 
Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other international 
documents.  
Ukraine conducts an open multidimensional foreign policy, which is called to 
expand cooperation with all interested partners, and provide the protection of own 
geopolitical interests. In the same time Ukrainian government wants to build the 
relations with its strategic partners exclusively on the principles of voluntarism, 
mutual aid, mutual non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference in 
internal affairs and peaceful coexistence.  
The precondition for the analysis of the relations between Ukraine and its 
strategic partners is a clear understanding of the basic historical values, principals 
and interests of Ukrainian people, which were partly discussed in the previous 
chapter. For country, which fought for own independence for the long centuries, the 
question of sovereignty and territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens, respect to 
the human rights and main principals of international law define the aims Ukrainian 
geopolitics. 
Historically Ukraine interacted with a plenty of geopolitical actors. Starting 
from the Kievan Rus and its first international treaty with Byzantium in 94594 
Ukraine formed own geopolitical strategy, which would respond to its geopolitical 
potential and possibilities. 
Due to the geopolitical changes and shifts throughout the history Ukraine had 
to reorient not only its policy and interests, but also build the relations with different 
partners. It is quite complicated to explore the cooperation between Ukraine and all 
its partners. However, today we see it is important to analyze the strategic relations 
of Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European states, the United States of America 
(USA), the Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The choice of the above mentioned geopolitical subjects 
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may be explained by the historical past of Ukraine, the role of these states in the 
current globalization processes, and the personal motivations of the author. The time 
framework of the research is the period between the last proclamation of Ukraine’s 
independence in 1991 and the present times. 
 
3.1. Transformation of geopolitical position of Ukraine in the context of 
relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe 
The independence of Ukraine in 1991 is often called as one of the most 
significant geopolitical developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union. An 
independent Ukraine seriously transforms the geopolitics of Europe, especially the 
Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). Zbigniev Brzenzinski explained without Ukraine 
Russia could not become European superpower. Today present Ukrainian leadership 
declares its interest in the closer cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, 
especially the European Union (EU). In the same way Ukraine is actively involved in 
the development of the relations with other countries of the CEE, which are outside 
the EU.95 
From the first days of its independence in 1991 Ukraine actively develops the 
relations with the post-communist CEE states. These strategic relations have been 
seen in Kiev as crucial for its geopolitical interests. Ukrainian policy makers, 
historians and other specialists of the international relations develop the geopolitics 
of Ukraine as the state of Central Eastern Europe, not the Eurasia or the former 
Soviet Union state. It is explained by more than one thousand year history of 
Ukrainian nation, which starts from the Kievan Rus, the historical threshold for the 
Eastern European Slavic states, ethno-cultural characteristics and geographical 
location in the Center of Europe. It is an interesting fact that in 1887 the geographers 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire calculated and set up a large marker defining the 
geographical center of Europe in the county of Rakhiv, Transcarpathian region, 
which is today a part of Ukraine (Figure 7).96 
After the collapse of Communism the Central Eastern European region has 
become one of the most dynamic on the continent. Due to their historical similarities, 
the CEE states share common interests and values. Most of those countries have 
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started the long process of building new democracies and market-oriented 
economics. Some of those states were successful in the reforms, others less, but all 
the CEE states realized they do not have a geopolitical future as a separate region, a 
“middle zone” between the Western Europe and Eurasia. The “return to into Europe” 
through the membership in such Western integrated institutions as the NATO and the 
European Union became one of the main goals in the geopolitics of each CEE state.97 
For the state, which borders with Russia and six more CEE states (Table 2), 
the development of the relations with neighbors is an effective tool to avoid the 
mergence of a new dividing line in Europe and exchange an experience of reform 
processes during the transition period. Due to the historical common past its borders 
with Russia are rather beneficial than threatening.98  
Ukraine has wide economic and military ties with Russia. In the same way 
the Russian Federation is the biggest energy supplier to the countries of Europe. We 
should mention that most of the CEE states 100% dependant on the Russian gas 
(Figure 8). Ukraine plays an extremely important role in the supply of Russian gas to 
the rest of European countries.  The national gas transportation system of Ukraine 
supplies the neighbor and other European states with energy resources through the 
wide network of pipelines, which run thousands kilometers through Ukraine (Figure 
9). Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine Yuriy Prodan claimed at the briefing in 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine: “The Ukrainian gas transportation system is 
reliable, highly skilled workers operate it and it is capable both to provide completely 
the economy of Ukraine and fulfill a reliable transit of gas to the European states.”99  
We believe that Ukraine will effectively use its national gas transportation 
system to provide the protection of own geopolitical interests in the relations with 
other European states and become the key geopolitical player in the energy security 
and stability in the CEE region in the close future. 
 For Ukraine as the biggest regional CEE state the Central European 
dimension of its geopolitics has an especial meaning. Many countries in the Central 
Europe consider Ukraine as an important constructor of regional security. Some of 
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Ukrainian initiatives like its 1996 proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the CEE were 
called to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapon in the CEE states. In May 1996 
The President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma said “Ukraine is speaking out for the 
territory of the countries supporting the Central European initiative to be free of 
nuclear weapons.”100  
In the report of the Ukrainian Institute for Strategic Studies the position of 
Ukrainian President was explained in the four reasons:  
 1. Today NATO and Russia deal only with regional conflicts, not superpower 
ones. According to the situation that appeared it would be more stable not to 
have nuclear weapon in Europe at all. 
2. NATO Member-States, especially the United States, feel uncomfortable 
with the desires of some states in Eastern Europe to develop own nuclear 
weapons. 
3. Due to the current geostrategic situation the Central European states, which 
want to get additional security guarantees, will not receive it outside the 
context of a CEE NWFZ 
4. After the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from CEE in 1994, there is no 
any need for tactical nuclear weapons.101 
 The last twenty years proved that the stable development of Ukraine is 
directly linked to Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine should also continue to develop 
mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Economic and social reforms, openness 
and dialogue with the European Union are one of the main goals of a new Ukrainian 
government. It is a fact that Ukraine reached a big positive progress in the reforms 
for the last years. As a result Ukraine’s government is currently discussing the Free 
Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European 
Union (Table 3). Both of these documents are expected to be signed by the end of 
2011.102  
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For Ukraine the Free Trade Agreement with EU is not only chance to get an 
access to the market with more than 500 millions of consumers, but also a great 
success for Ukrainian geopolitics. Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for External 
Trade describe the benefits of Ukraine after the FTA agreement with EU: “It will 
lower the costs of EU imports for Ukrainian businesses and consumers, and increase 
Ukrainian access to the EU single market, , which is the largest in the world. It will 
improve the conditions for EU investments in Ukraine by creating clearer, more 
transparent and predictable rules… It will contribute to the extension of European 
production standards, sharply improving the competitiveness of Ukrainian producers 
in international markets, including the EU- the largest world market.”103 
In this case the strategic partnership with the CEE states is extremely 
important. Due to the similar post-communist history, cultural and ethnic similarities 
and mutually beneficial relations Ukraine expects to receive the full support of these 
states on the way to the FTA, Association Agreement with EU and further 
integration processes. Similarly to Ukraine the CEE states declared a desire to 
integrate to the Western economic and security institutions few years ago.  
 Ukraine respects the efforts of the CEE states to expand the regional 
cooperation through such organizations as the Central European Initiative, Central 
European Free Trade Agreement and the Visegrad Group.  The cooperation with 
these organizations is one of the geopolitical priorities for Ukraine. For example, in 
June 1996 Ukraine joined the Central European Initiative, a group of 16 states of 
Central and South Eastern Europe, to expand the regional cooperation.  
The participation of Ukraine in the regional CEE organizations is very 
important from the point of view of cooperation with states being in similar 
geopolitical situation. A good example of such organization is the Visegrad Group 
consisting of four CEE states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. We 
should mention that this organization did not stop main activity after its members 
reached its main goal – entered the NATO and EU. This organization continues to 
expand the collaboration among its members. Ukraine as country which neighbors 
with three of V4 (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) has a very close relations with 
organization. The annual meetings of the leaders, forums, intergovernmental 
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exchanges, different projects in the format “V4 + Ukraine” are the forms of such 
cooperation.104 
The participation of Ukraine at the last Summit of Heads of Governments of 
V4 countries as well as Germany and Austria, which was held in Brarislava on 
January, 2011, proved an interest in the development of regional cooperation. 
Speaking at the plenary meeting the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov said: 
“Ukraine is interested in the development of fruitful neighborly relations with all 
countries in Europe, especially with the Visegrad countries…This format is very 
successful and we are ready to actively promote cooperation… Ukraine, like all the 
Visegrad countries, is located in transit Carpathian region, which is promising in the 
context of transit projects".105 
In this context the role of Ukraine in the transportation and energy sector is 
extremely important. The Visegrad countries are heavily dependant on Russian gas, 
which is transported through the gas transportation system of Ukraine. For example, 
Slovakia - 100%, Poland - 91%, Hungary – 90%, and Czech Republic – 74% are 
dependant on transported gas106. The last disagreements between Ukraine and Russia 
in 2008-2009 on the cost of transit gas threatened the gas supplies to the V4 
countries. For Russia own energy resources is an effective instrument of geopolitics. 
In this case Ukraine could become the main mediator in the relations with Russia. 
This kind of cooperation could strengthen the energetic security of the CEE region. 
At the same time, the experience of the V4 countries towards the EU and 
NATO is very important for Ukrainian policymakers. V4 actively support Euro-
Atlantic aspirations of new Ukrainian government and lobby its interests within EU. 
The military and peacekeeping cooperation is other sphere to develop. Annual joint 
military trainings and peacekeeping missions (Ukrpolbat, KFOR), utilization of 
missile fuel components (Ukrainian – Polish consortium) is a short list of such 
cooperation. Regional and transborder cooperation is an integral part of the relations 
between Ukraine and V4 states. Ukraine has two euro-regions with V4 countries – 
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“Bug” (Ukraine, Poland and Belarus) and “Carpathian euro region”. The main goal 
of such especial regions is to develop friendly neighbor relations, exchange cultural 
contacts and intensify the investment policy in a region. Ukraine also cooperates with 
the V4 countries in the framework of AER (Assembly of European regions), CLRAE 
(Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe), AEBR 
(Association of European Border Regions) and three neighborhood programs: 
“Poland – Belarus – Ukraine”, “Hungary – Belarus – Ukraine” and CADSES 
(Transnational cooperation between Central Adriatic zone, Danube and the Central-
Eastern Europe).107 
The International Visegrad Fund, founded in Slovakia in 2000, plays an 
important role in the socio-cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the V4 states. 
This Fund offers the scholarships for Ukrainian students and aspirants to study in one 
of V4 countries, grants for NGOs and universities to support democratic reforms and 
strengthen the cooperation between Ukraine and V4 countries.108 
Ukraine actively builds the strategic relations not only within the international 
organizations, but also with each state of a region. Ukrainian policymakers could 
refocus the relations with Poland, the state, which was historically characterized as 
hostile to Ukrainian people. In 1992 Ukraine and Poland signed a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, where both states renounced all territorial claims against 
each other and marked a new era in the relations between the two countries. Such 
rapprochement expanded the economic ties between Ukraine and Poland. The plan, 
offered by Ukrainian government, to transport the Caspian oil from Azerbaijan and 
Georgia though the national pipeline system “Odessa – Brody” (Sarmatia pipeline) to 
Gdansk (Poland) was highly supported by the Polish government. Two countries 
work together within a joint peacekeeping battalion “Ukrpolbat” in the international 
NATO and UN peacekeeping missions.109  
The last big project between two countries is “Ukraine – Poland UEFA Euro 
2012”. Two states host the leading European football championship. For Ukraine, it 
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is not only a sport competition, but billions of the US dollars of investment in the 
transport, sport, tourist and other industries. The country has received the modern 
airports, roads, trains, hotels, stadiums and working places. This project is a great 
chance for Ukraine to promote its nation in the eyes of Europe as friend and partner.  
 Ukraine builds exclusively good-neighboring mutually beneficial relations 
with Slovakia and Hungary. It is quite natural that border countries wish to form the 
closest foreign policy, which would provide a peace and stability in a region. Ukraine 
has on its territory approximately 160 thousand Hungarians. Hungarian Government 
defined Ukraine as the country with the most appropriate conditions for inner 
consolidation of Hungarians. Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia are post socialist 
countries which defined integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and the 
establishment of the democratic society as the main goal of national domestic and 
foreign policy. Neighboring Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia belong to the CEE 
region. These countries are interconnected with not only common regional military, 
ecological, transborder, socio-cultural and other interests, but, first of all, the 
economic development of the geostrategic European transit area, which includes the 
international automobile, railway and water transport routs within the states. Ukraine 
does not have any conflicts and problematic questions with Slovakia and Hungary. 
That is why, we can characterize the mutual relations with these states as close and 
friendly. 110 
 The relations between Ukraine and Czech Republic are characterized as 
friendly. The diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the newly founded Czech 
Republic were established in January 1993, but the history of Ukrainian-Czech 
relations starts centuries ago. For example, the grand prince of Kievan Rus Vladimir 
the Great married to Bohemian woman Malfrida in the end of X century. Czech 
defeat at the Battle of White Mountain (Bila Hora) led to the major displacement of 
Czech people in central Europe.111 The thousands of Czech families emigrated from 
the Czech lands mainly to the territory of modern Ukraine and few other states.112 
Hetman of Ukraine Pylyp Orlyk, who was born in a family of the first Czech 
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emigrants, later became the author of one of the first state constitutions in Ukraine 
and all Europe.113  
At present the relations between independent Ukraine and the Czech 
Republic are characterized by high level of collaboration in the political, economic 
and cultural spheres. More than 70 intergovernmental agreements and treaties form 
the legal base for the cooperation. It is an interesting fact that Ukraine joined the 
Council of Europe during the presidency of Czech Republic in this organization. The 
official visits of the Presidents of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma in 1995 and Viktor 
Yushchenko in 2009 to Czech Republic, and the Presidents of Czech Republic 
Vaclav Havel in 1997, and Vaclav Klaus in 2005 positively influenced on the mutual 
relations between two countries.114 
According to the Concept of Foreign Policy of the CR, Czech Republic 
considers Ukraine as an important European country, on 
which stability in Central and Eastern Europe depends. Czech Republic supports 
Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations of Ukraine and will do everything possible to 
expand mutual beneficial cooperation. Czech Republic also claims that European 
Union should be open to all European states that meet the main criteria of EU.115 
Analyzing the similar views on the main global problems two countries 
should continue the cooperation in the peacekeeping activities. The great example of 
such cooperation was common participation in the multinational stabilization force 
during the Iraq crisis. Ukraine and Czech Republic sent its military units to Iraq. 
Ukrainian airlift aircraft Antonov-124 “Ruslan” transported Czech military 
personnel and medical field hospitals to Kuwait and Afghanistan. Ukraine was one of 
the first countries, which sent the medical aid and drugs to Czech Republic to prevent 
the spread of infectious diseases after unprecedented floods in August, 2002.116  
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 Other important fact is that the Czech Republic has on its territory 
approximately 132 thousand of Ukrainians.117 We should mention Ukrainians make 
the largest group of foreigners in the CR. Most of Ukrainians came from the Western 
parts of Ukraine in the early 1990s. The Government of Ukraine defined one of the 
main tasks in the relations with Czech Republic to create the conditions for inner 
consolidation of Ukrainians on the Czech territory and will do everything possible to 
protect the interests of its citizens. 
In conclusion, the relations with Czech Republic and other CEE states and 
cooperation with regional organizations such as Central European Initiative and the 
Visegrad Group are strategically important for Ukraine. The strengthening of the ties 
with Mitteleuropa might help Ukraine in its Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The 
CEE states highly support the democratic reforms in Ukraine and actively promote 
the interest of Ukraine within EU. With the expansion of NATO and the EU and the 
inclusion of new members - the CEE states – the geopolitical situation of Ukraine 
has significantly changed. Ukraine became the direct neighbor of EU. The four of 
EU members border with Ukraine. That’s why, we think the cooperation between 
Ukraine and other CEE states has a great potential for it development in the context 
of regional security and stability. 
 
3.2.The United States – Ukrainian strategic relations 
The history of relations between Ukraine and USA is often called as the “long 
road to strategic partnership”. During the Cold War Ukraine had a limited 
independent foreign policy, especially with the United States, which was considered 
to be hostile in the eyes of Soviet leadership. After the dissolution of the USSR 
twenty years ago the USA faced with a serious problem. American leadership was 
not ready to such geopolitical changes. With the search of new global role the United 
States had also to think how to deal with fifteen new states, including Ukraine, which 
appeared in place of a single one. For the US Ukraine was only a part of the Soviet 
Empire with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. During the first years 
American leadership did everything possible to convince Ukraine to give up its 
nuclear weapon in exchange on the security guarantees and economic assistance. The 
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Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986, high costs on the keeping of nuclear arsenal and 
the desire of Ukrainian leadership to promote the state as the friendly non-nuclear 
European country closed Americans to its goal. 
 We should mention that the United States in 1991-1994 focused mainly on 
the relations with Russia and did not seriously develop the relations with other 
former Soviet states. However, the strategic review of the US foreign policy, great 
disappointment with Russia’s performance (Russia alone is not the same as the 
USSR!) and the evolution of expert thinking about the post-Soviet space pushed a 
new American administration to cooperate with all Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors, 
with a special position reserved for Ukraine.118 
 The following cooperation between two states was increasingly productive. 
The dialogues between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on the nuclear issue 
lead to a trilateral agreement on nuclear energy and disarmament in January 1994. 
The non-nuclear status of Ukraine marked a new era in the relations between two 
countries. The US Government declared 1994 the “year of Ukraine” and claimed 
about the full support of democratic economic reforms. In 1996, the high-level 
Commission under the leadership of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the US 
Vice-President Al Gore stressed on the importance of bilateral cooperation and 
evaluated these relations to the level of a “strategic partnership.”119  
The security treaty and strategic partnership with the USA is very important 
in the context of Ukrainian geopolitics. The role of the United States as the global 
dominating power could be helpful in the reforming processes of Ukraine. Ukraine 
has also received a huge financial and technical assistance from the USA in the 
amount excided only by its funding of Israel and Egypt. The US – Russian relations 
became more strained after Russia’s sales of weapon and nuclear reactor to Iran, 
improving China-Russia relations, and Russian attempts to intensify its control over 
the Caspian basin. In this case, by 1995 the relations with Ukraine had become an 
important part of the US foreign policy. Ukraine preceded Russia as a Member of the 
Council of Europe and the NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Ukrainian contingent in 
the Balkans assisted the US President Clinton administration in the arming of Bosnia 
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as a part of the US strategy to build a well-armed Bosnian state. Unlike the period of 
previous Kravchuk administration when the official visits were rare and ineffective, 
Ukraine hosted not only the US President Bill Clinton, but also high cabinet officials, 
congressmen and military delegations. Ukraine also hosted a joint military training of 
the USA, Slovakia, Hungary, and Ukrainian troops in 1995.120 
 However, we should mention that Ukraine and the USA have faced with 
some difficulties in the sphere of military and political cooperation in the following 
years. Ukrainian export of military technologies to China, Iran and Libya was not 
positively evaluated by the US Government. In addition the official Washington was 
disappointed with the level of economic reforms in Ukraine.121 Kuchmagate, a 
scandal surrounding a murder of Ukrainian journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, pressure 
on the independent media, Ukrainian arm sales to Macedonia and allegations that 
Kuchma approved the sale of four highly sophisticated radar systems “Kolchuga” to 
Iraq, seriously worsened the relations between Ukraine and the USA. The Ukraine–
developed “Kolchuga” system was one of few in the world systems, which was able 
to detect the US “Stealth” aircraft and seriously threatened the US interests in Iraq. 
As a result the USA cancelled a financial aid and seriously reviewed its policy 
according to Ukraine. Even the Government of Ukraine had taken a plenty of steps to 
improve the situation, including the further sending of 1800 soldiers to help to 
stabilize Iraq, the relations remained problematic.122 
 However, the US-led global war on terrorism required more support from 
other countries, including Ukraine, than American government expected before. 
Ukraine as the largest contiguous European state located on the crossroads between 
Western Europe and Eurasian Russia had a potential to play an important role in the 
global coalition in combating regional and global terrorism. Ukraine could contribute 
to the US campaign against terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of 
democracy would allow Ukraine to have one of the biggest European democratic 
armed forces and play important role in the security and stability in a region. Second, 
such role of Ukraine in the team of global coalition would give Ukraine the authority 
to play diplomatic role in the “frozen conflicts” between the former Soviet republics. 
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That is why, the military transformation reforms together with democratization 
processes in Ukraine determine the level of cooperation with the USA in the struggle 
against terrorism.123 
The new elected government understood the importance of mutual 
cooperation in the war on terrorism in the context of Ukrainian – American relations. 
After the bomb attacks in London in July 2005 the leader of Orange revolution 
President Viktor Yushchenko claimed: “Terrorism is a common challenge for every 
country which requires a common solution.”124 
We should mention that with a new Orange administration the US – 
Ukrainian relations have seriously progressed compared to the epoch of previous 
Kuchma’s administration.  The newly-elected leadership clearly declared its Euro-
Atlantic integration aspirations. The meeting between the US President George W. 
Bush and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko in April 2005 marked a new 
era in the relations between two countries. Bush confirmed the US support for 
Ukraine’s future possible membership in the NATO and World Trade Organization 
(WTO).125  
Both Presidents declared the strategic format of bilateral relations and 
confirmed it the Joint Statement of Presidents of Ukraine and the USA. The US 
position to strengthen the relations with Ukraine lead to the signing of the Charter of 
the Strategic Partnership between two countries in December 2008. In the Preamble 
to the Charter Ukraine and the USA it is affirmed the importance of the relationship 
as friends and strategic partners. Both countries confirm the importance of the 
security assurances for Ukraine described in the Trilateral Statement by the 
Presidents of the USA, Russian Federation and Ukraine on January 14, 1994, and the 
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s 
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 
5, 1994. The Charter consists of the sections, which relate to the principles of 
cooperation, defense and security cooperation, economic, trade and energy 
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cooperation, strengthening democracy, increasing people-to-people contacts and 
cultural exchanges.126 
These documents provoked the fact that Ukraine and the USA started to hold 
regular meetings at the high-level.  For example, the Ukrainian-American Strategic 
Partnership Commission was established to be the principal intergovernmental body, 
which aimed to implement the Charter and regulate bilateral coordination 
mechanisms. Other spheres of Commission’s activities relate to the areas of 
economics and investment, energy and nuclear safety, nonproliferation and arms 
sales, science and technology, military cooperation and political dialogue. For 
Ukrainian geopolitical interests, the US recognition of Ukraine as a market economy 
is very important. This status allowed Ukraine to abolish Jackson – Vanik 
Amendment (adopted in 1974) and receive the US support of Ukraine’s accession to 
the WTO. The US Government has also opened such important organizations as the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the US Chamber of Commerce in 
Ukraine.127 
Ukraine and the USA signed also few more important documents to expand 
the legal base for mutual cooperation in the sphere of trade and investment 
cooperation, cooperation in science and technology and cooperation in the space 
research,   memorandum on cooperation between the Ministries of Economy, 
Ministries of Health, cooperation in nuclear safety and others. In total Ukraine and 
the USA signed more than 120 bilateral documents.128 
 The last important document, signed between Ukraine and the USA in March, 
2008, is the Priorities for U.S.-Ukraine Cooperation (Road Map). The list of 
priorities includes: 
1. Deepening Ukraine's integration in European, Euro-Atlantic and global 
institutions; 
2. Strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, promoting reform of the legal 
system, law; enforcement and security structures, as well as accelerating 
efforts to combat corruption and trafficking in persons; 
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3. Improving Ukraine's investment climate and promoting closer economic 
and commercial cooperation; 
4. Building Ukrainian energy security, energy efficiency, diversification of 
sources and transparency; 
5. Enhancing efforts to promote nonproliferation, arms control and 
disarmament goals; 
6. Continuing Ukraine's defense and military transformation; 
7. Exploring new areas for cooperation in high-technology, space and 
missile defense; 
8. Continuing to work together toward resolution of the Transdnistrovia and 
other regional conflicts and to encourage the promotion of democracy in 
Belarus; 
9. Developing regional organizations; 
10. Enhancing bilateral cooperation through exchanges and visits; 
11. Remembering the 1932-33 Holodomor (Great Famine) in Ukraine; 
12. Combating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.129 
Analyzing the above-mentioned list of priorities we may conclude that the 
USA remains the key partner of Ukraine. The present Government of Ukraine 
considers the US as the important partner in the plenty of national projects in the 
sphere of energy, such as the production of energy from shale gas and coal bed 
methane, projects in the oil and gas on the Black Sea shelf, nuclear fuel production 
for Ukrainian nuclear power plants and nuclear safety projects for operating plants. 
From the point of geopolitical interests the enhanced cooperation with the USA may 
diversify the energy resources and avoid the dependence on Russian energy 
resources (gas and nuclear fuel).130 
We should mention that when the world faced with the world economic crisis 
the bilateral trade dynamic between Ukraine and the USA continued to develop. For 
example, the bilateral trade grew by 76% in 2010 and reached to the amount of 2426 
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million dollars USA.131 The export of Ukrainian goods to the U.S. grew by 21% to 
1082 million dollars. The imports of American goods to Ukraine increased by 51% 
and amounted to 1344 million dollars (Table 4). The USA remains one of the biggest 
investors for Ukraine. In 2010 Ukraine's economy received more than 1 billion 218 
million US dollars of the US investments, which is 2.7% of all Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) in Ukraine. In the same time Ukraine is a home for 1545 
registered companies with the US capital. The most attractive areas for American 
investors are agriculture, trade, energy, and financial sector. 132 
Ukraine and USA actively cooperate in the field of military collaboration, 
which is focused on the involvement of the US experience in the military reform in 
Ukraine, improvement of national Joint Major efforts in the field of military 
cooperation focused on the involvement of DOD capabilities to promote military 
reform in Ukraine, improvement of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces of Ukraine, national 
modernization of the military landfills, organization of joint military trainings and 
operations against international terrorism.133 
Ukraine as one of the world’s top 10 states in the field of space exploration 
and aerospace industry is interested in the cooperation in science and technology 
with the USA. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich in his speech dedicated 
to the 90th anniversary of Ukrainian astronaut Georgiy Beregovoy’s birth claimed: “I 
see our space achievements as a driving force of the country’s development. 
Participation in space programs indicates technological capabilities, economic 
prospects and the level of national security of a state… Ukraine is one of the five 
countries in the world which have a complete rocket production cycle. Therefore, it 
requires us not to stop, but look for new ways to develop aerospace 
industry.”134 Analyzing the words of President we may conclude that cooperation 
with the USA in the sphere of aerospace engineering will continue its successful 
development. As an example of such cooperation is the realization of project “Taurus 
– 2”, where Ukrainian state-owned aerospace design bureau “Yuzhnoye” jointly with 
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its American partner Orbital Sciences Corporation develop a new space complex 
"Taurus-2”  at the base of Ukrainian rocket carrier "Mayak". It is planned that 
"Taurus-2" will become the main expendable launch system designed to launch 
payloads  into the space for the US Government.135 
The USA is the biggest partner of Ukraine in the nuclear research and 
security. At the last world’s Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear 
Energy, which was held on April 19, 2011, in Kiev, Dr. Zbigniev Brzezinsky, the 
Head of the US Delegation, claimed: “Ukraine has clearly shown its leadership on 
nuclear security and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  Not only Ukraine 
chosen this leadership role on reducing the chances of nuclear terrorism, but Ukraine 
has chosen a path towards the peaceful use of nuclear technology.  As Ukraine’s ally 
and strategic partner, the United States is proud to be a part of these efforts, and 
proud to have helped the people of Ukraine over the past quarter century.  The 
United States is committed to completing the Chornobyl projects and converting the 
damaged reactor site to an environmentally safe and secure condition.”136 We should 
mention that the USA became the biggest donor of the Foundation “Shelter”, an 
organization, which is collecting money for the safety upgrading program at the 
Chernobyl nuclear station, after the Summit. The amount of grant was 360 million of 
the US dollars.137 
People-to-people contacts, cultural exchanges, the cooperation between the 
cities of Ukraine and the USA and support of Ukrainian citizens on territory of the 
USA are another important task of Ukrainian geopolitics. The USA as a 
multinational state is a home for a large community of Ukrainians. Over 890 
thousands of Ukrainians live in the USA. The Government of Ukraine actively 
cooperates with the United States to protect the interests and rights of its citizens, 
help Ukrainian Diaspora to promote its ethnic and cultural needs. Through the 
Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), which is the Ukrainian American 
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community's public relations office in Washington DC, the support of Ukrainian and 
American governments an effective tool of such cooperation the Ukrainian Congress 
Committee of America (UCCA) was created in 1997.138 
The UCCA is a group of Members of the US Congress (more than 40 
Congressmen), who take an interest of Ukraine and actively work to promote better 
Ukrainian – American relations. The UCCA in the cooperation with the Ukrainian 
American community is a valuable source of information for the rest Congressmen 
about the current situation in Ukraine. The main functions of the UCCA are: 
• Coordination and consolidation of development of organized Ukrainian life in 
the USA and support of Ukrainian American community in the civic and 
cultural life of the country 
• Representation of the Ukrainian American community before the 
governmental structures of the USA 
• Promotion of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation in the eyes of Americans and 
provide all possible support for the consolidation of an independent and 
democratic Ukrainian state 
• Promotion of Ukrainian nation among nations as a equitable and friendly 
member of the family of sovereign nations 
• Providing assistance to the Ukrainian nation through cooperation with private 
and governmental organizations 
• To assist, support and cooperate with the United States government in 
creating an equitable world order 
• In order to accomplish its goals, the UCCA has the following instruments: 
loyal cooperation with government authorities in their policies, obtains 
government contacts through consultation and correspondence with lay and 
religious organizations, publication of the relevant materials including press 
releases, journals books and other papers, collects and archives 
•  Documentation on the participation of Ukrainians in the activities of the 
USA.139 
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The successful cooperation between Ukraine and USA during in the last years 
created a solid base for further development of bilateral strategic partnership.  
The main geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the relations with the USA are the 
development of democracy, assistance in economic and political reforms, military, 
transport, energy and scientific cultural cooperation. For Ukraine the strategic 
partnership with the USA is especially important. Only the USA is powerful enough 
to counter the strategic weight of the global powers such as neighboring Russia with 
its little, but still imperialist ambitions, extremely growing China or the potential 
threat from the hypothetic union of Islamic states. In this case, we believe that the 
further strengthening of the mutual relations between Ukraine and the USA will be a 
key issue in the geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine. 
 
3.3. Geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the cooperation with Russian 
Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought unprecedented changes that 
cardinally reshaped the world geopolitics and ended the long-lasted system of bi-
polar system of international relations. The former countries of the USSR, including 
Ukraine, felt the impact of that event to the highest degree. The recent civil 
upheavals and revolutions in the post-Soviet area were the outcomes of what former 
Russian President Vladimir Putin called “The greatest political catastrophe of the 
century.”140 
 The break-up of the USSR became a big “surprise” not only for people, but 
also for the policy-makers of the new established states. The long tradition of 
common history within a Soviet Union pushed the leaders of those countries to create 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such creation could help new states 
to adapt easer to a new geopolitical situation and provide the base for the following 
cooperation.  
That is why, the leaders of eleven former Soviet republics agreed to create a 
new regional intergovernmental organization the Commonwealth of Independent 
States with a headquarter in Minks, Belarus. The Charter of the CIS and the Protocol 
on Establishment of the CIS were signed on December 21, 1991 and marked the 
beginning of a new history for all those states. Ukraine similarly to other former 
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Soviet countries felt more secure to cooperate among the brother states than with 
outsiders. In the same time the CIS was not the supranational organization, it was 
rather forum to discuss the problems, related to the social and economic reforms in 
the new states. The membership in the CIS did not prevent the cooperation with other 
regional and international organization. Except it Ukraine as a member of the United 
Nations organization since 1945 wanted to keep its own sovereign geopolitical 
interests.141 
One of the issues, the new established organization had to solve, was the 
external debt of the Soviet Union. As the USSR broke up, the US Treasury had one 
concern to make sure that all the republics have a joint responsibility to serve the 
debt. However, Russian leadership understood that it would not be possible. They 
offered to take over all the debt on the conditions they would receive all the Soviet 
assets. All the former Soviet states, except Ukraine, agreed on such offer. The 
government of Ukraine suspected that Russia was cheating and demanded to show 
all the accounts of the Soviet assets. Russia was not able to provide any documents. 
After the long-lasting discussions about the Soviet external debt Ukraine finally 
agreed to recognize Russia as the USSR successor. For Ukraine this agreement was 
highly beneficial. The state received a chance to start own national development 
without the external debt.142 
 Ukraine considers the CIS as the framework to expand its economic and trade 
ties with a new independent states. However, the CIS Agreement on the Creation of 
Free Trade Zone in 1994, which was called to form the base for the Free Trade 
regime among the states, was not ratified by Russia.  The absence of conflict-solving 
mechanisms within a framework of the CIS forced the states to establish bilateral 
agreements between the countries and did not count on the CIS. The trade, economic 
and organizational system of the CIS was inefficient.143 
As a result five years later Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said at the 
summit of the CIS presidents: “I am clearly and fully aware that a shapeless 
organization, like the CIS has no future”144 Later Ukrainian leader named the CIS as 
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a “purely consultative body” and refused to participate in the reforms of its 
structures. Ukrainian geopoliticians claimed that the CIS was not the institution to 
protect the national interests. The sovereigntists argued that the possibility of the 
renewal of “supranationalism” within the CIS might threaten the independence of 
Ukraine. However, we should mention that Ukraine did not quit its membership in 
that organization.145 It can be explained by the desire of Kiev to continue the 
cooperation in the sphere of culture, education, transport and energy resources. 
 We may observe that since 1992 Ukrainian leadership plays a “balancing 
role” in the region, both within and outside the CIS. Kiev refused to participate in 
any CIS security treaties in order to counterbalance Russian domination in the CIS 
and its plans to turn it to the military union in the future. Ukraine considers the CIS, 
as the union of two blocks of countries. The first, led by Russia, is composed of 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and few other states, and other block, led by Ukraine, 
consists of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Moldova and Georgia, the states who support 
Ukraine’s desire to play a counter-balance role within the CIS. The establishment of 
an informal Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova (GUAM) group with the 
office in Kiev confirms this trend (Figure 10). Within this group Ukraine declared 
the policy of “Neutrality, Non-Nuclear and Non-Block Status” as a founding 
principal of the initiative.146 
 The GUAM is a regional Organization for Democracy and Economic 
Development, which consists of the four abovementioned states, was officially 
established at the summit in Yalta, Ukraine on June 6-7, 2001. Turkey and Latvia 
became the official observers of Organization. However, we should mention the 
cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova started with the 
GUAM Consultative Forum, which was establishes on October 10, 1997 in 
Strasbourg. After Uzbekistan joined the initiative in 1999, the Organization was 
renamed as GUUAM. Due to the domestic problems, like Andijan Massacre of 2005, 
the tragic event, when Uzbek military fired into the crowd of protesters in Andijan 
and killed the hundreds of people, the Uzbekistan ended its membership. So, the 
organization returned its previous name. Today the organization sets the highest aims 
to expand the cooperation between the states. The main goals of the GUAM are the 
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promotion of democratic values, respect to the principals of international law and 
human rights, strengthening of international and regional security and stability, 
European integration processes with a common security space, increased economic, 
energy, transport, scientific and humanitarian cooperation.147 
Due to the geopolitical interests GUAM gives Ukraine an instrument for the 
closer cooperation with other regional countries. For example, within the special 
program between the USA and GUAM on the trade, transport, border and customs 
control, combating terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, the GUAM 
states in the cooperation with the US Government and the Centre SECI have 
implemented a number of joint projects. For example, GUAM launched a special 
Virtual Center for combating terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and other 
dangerous crimes.148 
 Analyzing the relations between Ukraine and Russian Federation these 
relations remain one of the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. Since Ukraine and 
Russia began its start from one state ancient Kievan Rus the relations between these 
two countries are much more than just strategic. We will not analyze the relations 
between Ukraine and Russia in the Soviet Era or even earlier period, because it has 
nothing to do with the current political and socio-economic relations between two 
states. 
Since the collapse of the USSR Ukrainian-Russian relations have been 
conflictive, unstable and often unpredictable. The most important issues, which 
Ukraine and Russia disagreed, relate to the role and functions of the CIS, the location 
of Russian navy in Ukraine (Sevastopol, Black sea), delimitation of borders, 
Ukrainian integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic organizations (especially in the 
context of the eastward enlargement of NATO), confrontation between the orthodox 
churches of Kiev and Moscow patriarchate, rights of Ukrainians and Russians in both 
countries and other problems of political and socio-economic character. 149 
In the same time Ukraine and Russia are historically, geographicaly (both 
countries have more than 2250 km of the common state border), linguistically, 
culturaly linked and remain more than just strategic partners. Ukraine and Russia are 
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strongly interdependent in the economic sphere. Such interdependence forces both 
countries to strengthen the mutual beneficial cooperation, solve the problems and 
work on the further development of relations. As a result two countries signed 
Ukrainian – Russian Basic Treaty on May 1997 that marked the beginning of totally 
new relationship. The treaty included the mutual recognition of the borders and legal 
foundation of the relations between two countries. Under the treaty Ukrainian 
government allowed Russia to rent the land for its naval base in Crimea, Ukraine.150 
We should mention the fact of presence of Russian armed forces on the 
territory of Ukraine seriously worsened the bilateral relations. In order to balance 
with Russia Ukraine signed two military cooperation treaties with NATO in 1997 
and 1998. In 1997 Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova established an 
informal group, previously discussed in this thesis, GUAM Organization for 
Democracy and Economic Development. However, the President of Ukraine Leonid 
Kuchma, who was accused in the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze 
in 2000, faced with rising political protests in Ukraine. In the search of support 
Ukrainian president addressed to the Russian leader Vladimir Putin. During his trip 
to Ukraine in 2001 Mr. Putin promised a full support of Ukrainian president in the 
exchange on the renewal of high level of cooperation between two countries.151  
We should mention that it was not the first time of such “support” in the 
exchange of strategic partnership with Russia. Russia often used economic, including 
gas supplies, instruments to keep Ukraine away from the Euro-Atlantic integration 
processes and develop the “brothers” relations with Russia.  
Anyways in the period prior to the Orange revolution the relations between 
Ukraine and Russia had improved to the qualitevely new level. Ukrainian President 
Kuchma oriented a foreign policy towards Moscow in his second term. The end of 
Kuchma’s regim and the Orange revolution in 2004 brought serious confrontations 
between two countries. The victory of pro-Western oriented President Viktor 
Yushchenko and his team marked a serious defeat of Russian foreign policy. Russia 
lost it’s the biggest strategic friend in Europe. The new-elected President Viktor 
Yushchenko, who declared its Euro-Atlantic integration ambitions, behaved 
negatively to the development of the relations with Russia and openly confronted in 
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the relations with Ukrainian the most strategic partner. We believe it was the biggest 
mistake of Yushchenko during his leadership in the sphere of foreign policy. The 
following economic crisis in Ukraine, which occurred in 2005, and political crisis, 
provoked by internal division in the Orange coalition, led to the dismissal of 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s government in 2005.152  
As result Ukraine faced with the following years of political struggle for the 
power between the leaders of Orange revolution, absence of the complex of effective 
economic and social reforms and the stagnation of the state’s development. 
Historically, culturally and economically Ukraine and Russia are very close states. 
However, the anti-Russian policy of the Orange leaders provoked a crisis in the 
relations between two countries. 
Due to the low rate of Orange leaders opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich 
became a new president of Ukraine in 2009. Entering his position, Mr. Yanukovich 
argued, that anti-Russian position of previous political leadership seriously worsened 
Ukrainian economy, which was highly interdependent with Russia. At the same time 
Ukrainian pro-Western oriented leaders did not seriously benefited from Ukraine’s 
relations with Europe. Yanukovich launched a new era of the pragmatic, equal and 
mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and Russia. The first years of 
Yanukovich’s presidency proved the importance of such relations for Ukraine. The 
strengthening of the economic, political, social, scientific and cultural cooperation 
was important for both countries. With presidency of Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine 
has also received a strong consolidated vertical oriented political leadership, which 
was very important in the terms of permanent struggle for power and political 
division of Ukraine. At the same time Ukrainian President did not appear to be pro-
Russian. The well-maneuvering foreign policy of Viktor Yanukovich and his team 
lead to the serious improvement in the relations with Europe. Due to the long 
procedures of negotiations Ukraine is expecting to sign an Association Agreement 
with European Union this year.  
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4. The geopolitical role of Ukraine in the globalization processes 
4.1.Ukraine in the system of global international organizations 
The role of international organizations as a form of international cooperation 
is very important in the modern system of multilateral international relations. The 
modern world is becoming increasingly complicated and cotroversial. There are 
more than 200 countries, tens of thousands political parties, millions of 
parliamentarians, ministers, heads of governments and presidents. Most of these 
politicians or political insitutions have their own opinion on the development of their 
country, nation and world community in total. From the history we know that the 
different interpretation of national interests among the states could lead to the 
conflicts. That is why, international organizations are called to solve interstate 
conflicts, define a common goal for all the members of organizations. 
Ukraine as a member of world community actively cooperates with other 
countries within a framework of international organizations. Before analysis of 
Ukraine’s activity in the system of international organizations we would like to 
explore the legal base of Ukraine in the sphere of international relations and 
cooperation. The main document of Ukraine as the subject of international relations 
is “The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine”, adopted on by Verkhovna 
Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) on July 6, 1990. This document proclaimed that 
“Ukraine as a subject of international law shall conduct direct relations with other 
states, conclude agreements with them, exchange diplomatic, consular and trade 
missions, participate in activities of international organizations:... Ukraine shall act 
as an equal participant of international relations, actively promote strengthening of 
universal peace and international security, and directly participates in all-European 
process and European bodies".153  
From the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine we may conclude that 
Ukraine as a subject of international law considers international organizations as the 
form of multilateral cooperation with other countries. Ukraine expects to join the 
world community in the solving of global issues, including the providing of security 
and stability in European region. The main bodies to represent Ukraine and its 
geopolitical interests within a framework of international organizations are the 
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President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Misters of Ukraine and the Parliament of 
Ukraine. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is a part of Ukrainian 
government, which oversees the foreign policy of Ukraine and represents it in the 
international organizations.  According to the other document “Declaration of 
Independence of Ukraine” Ukrainian territory shall be indivisible and inviolable. In 
the territory of Ukraine, the Constitution and laws of Ukraine shall be in effect from 
this day. The Act came into force on the date of adoption by the Verkhovna Rada 
(Parliament of Ukraine) on August 24, 1991.154 With the proclamation of own 
independence Ukraine has received a right to conduct independent foreign policy and 
protect its geopolitical interests. As a sovereign state Ukraine is eligible to use all the 
legal instruments in its foreign policy. Ukraine builds mutually beneficial and 
friendly relations with other sovereign states on the bilateral basis and within a 
framework of international organizations.  
"The Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" was approved as the 
national concept of foreign policy on July 2, 1993. According to the document 
Ukraine "due to its geopolitical location, historical experience, cultural traditions, 
rich natural resources, powerful economic, scientific/technical and intellectual 
potential, Ukraine ought to and should become an influential global state capable of 
playing a considerable role in providing political/economic stability in Europe. 
Active and full-scale accession to the global community is an inalienable condition 
of successful realization of Ukraine's possibilities. Overcoming crisis in society and 
proceeding along the path towards the world, Ukraine is guided by its fundamental 
national interests, in accordance to which the grounds, directions, priorities and 
functions of its foreign policy are determined".155 It means that Ukraine as the largest 
contiguous European state conducts active foreign policy to provide the security and 
stability in the region. The foreign policy of Ukraine and its geopolitics derives from 
the geographical, economic, demographic, military and political potential of the 
state; is guided by the national interests and international law and called to make 
Ukraine influential member of global community.  
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 Ukraine is an active participant of international organizations. Currently, 
Ukraine is a member of more than 40 intergovernmental and nongovernmental global 
and regional organizations. It is quite complicated and broad issue to analyze 
Ukrainian membership in all these organizations. The cooperation of Ukraine and 
such regional organizations as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the GUAM 
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the European Union and 
the Visegrad Group was partly discussed in the previous chapter. Today we consider 
important to analyze Ukrainian activities in the main universal global organization 
such as the United Nations. 
The United Nations (UN) is the biggest, most influential global and universal 
organization. The UN was created in the postwar period in 1945 to unite the nations 
and prevent another world war, strengthen an international security and cooperation 
in solving international economic, political and socio-cultural problems, promote 
respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms. Organization provide a 
forum for its 192 Member States to cooperate on the wide range of issues, through 
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and 
other bodies and committees.156 
The modern aims of the United Nations are: 
• To promote and keep peace throughout the world; 
• To develop friendly relations among nations; 
• To help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to 
conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each 
other’s rights and freedoms; 
• To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these 
goals.157 
The Charter of the United Nations, which was signed in San Francisco, USA, 
on June 27 in 1945, is the foundational treaty of the United Nations organization. It is 
an important fact that Ukraine was one of the first nations to put its signature under 
the United Nations Charter and became the founding member of the UN in 1945. 
Ukraine as a legal party of international relations was represented by own delegation 
at the founding session of the UN, while the Soviet Union delegation presented the 
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interests of other 16 Soviet republics. Delegation of Ukraine actively participated in 
the writing of the United Nations Charter. The Head of the Ukrainian delegation at 
the United Nations Conference on International Organization Dmytro Manuilskiy 
was elected as a Chairman of the First Committee, which worked on the text and 
structure of the Preamble and Chapter 1 (Purposes and Principles) of the United 
Nations Charter.158 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Ukraine determined membership in 
the UN as one of its foreign policy priorities and simply continued to participate in 
this universal organization. On February 6, 1992 in a letter to the United Nations 
Secretary-General the Minister of Foreign Policy of Ukraine made the following 
statement: “As one of the founding states of the United Nations and as a member of 
the most of the international organizations of its system, Ukraine reaffirms its lofty 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the acts establishing the 
relevant international organizations. Ukraine also reaffirms its obligations under 
international treaties concluded by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the 
framework, or under the auspices, of such organizations, before the Declaration of 
the Independence of Ukraine.”159 It means that Ukraine respects the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter and continues to contribute to the UN activities in the 
field of international security and stability, respect for human rights, disarmament, 
economic and socio-cultural development and other spheres. 
The history of the successful membership of Ukraine in the UN is confirmed 
by the high number of official visits of UN Secretaries-General to Ukraine. UN 
Secretaries-General visited Ukraine six times. In particular, U Thant visited 
Ukraine in 1962, Kurt Waldheim in 1981, Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1987, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in 1993, Kofi Annan in 2002 and Pan Ki Mun in 2011.160 
Ukraine was active participant of the regulation processes in Yugoslavia 
crisis. Ukraine condemned the tragic events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
escalation of the conflict between all the parties. Ukraine thought that peace in this 
region could be received only on the basis of the principles of respect for the political 
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independence of the internationally recognized State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
respect by all neighbors of its territorial integrity. The delegation of Ukraine to the 
UN claimed about the importance of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the Ukrainian battalion carried out the peacekeeping mission.161  
The history of Ukrainian the UN Peacekeeping activities starts with adoption 
by Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) the resolution № 2538-ХII on 3 July 
1992 “On participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in UN Peacekeeping Forces 
in conflict zones on the territory of Former Republic of Yugoslavia”. Since that time 
Ukraine sent more than 40 000 of its citizens to the UN Peacekeeping missions in 
more than 20 countries. From that time 49 Ukrainian peacekeepers lost their lives in 
missions. Ukraine is currently participating in 6 ongoing UN peacekeeping 
operations.162  
For the last 20 years, Ukrainian soldiers participated in the following 
peacekeeping operations: 
• - Peacekeeping operations of UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR, Jul 
1992 – Dec 1995); 
• - UN mission in Tajikistan (UNMIT, Dec 1994 - Mar 2000); 
• - UN Mission of preventive deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP, Jun 
1995 – Mar 1999); 
• - International Stabilization Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR in 
B&H, Dec 1995 – Dec 1999); 
• - UN Mission in Angola (UNMIA, Jan 1996 – Feb 1999); 
• - UN mission in Prevlaka peninsula, Croatia (UNMIP, Jan 1996 – Dec 
2002); 
• - UN Mission in Eastern Slavonia (UNMIES, Apr 1996 – Jan 1998); 
• - UN Mission in Guatemala (UNMIG, Jan -May 1997); 
• - OSCE verification mission in Kosovo (Dec 1998 – Mar 1999); 
• - Special UN Mission in Afghanistan (Apr 2000 – May 2001); 
• - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, Jul 2000 – Aug 
2006); 
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• - OSCE Mission in Georgia (Aug 2000 – Dec 2005); 
• - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, Dec 2000 – Dec 
2005); 
• - Multinational Forces in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Aug 2003 – Dec 
2005); 
• - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, Dec 2000 – Jul 2008); 
• - Multinational forces in Iraq (Dec 2005 – Dec 2008); 
• - UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG, Aug 2001 – Jun 2009).163 
Being a part of the UN peacekeeping contingent Ukraine is deeply convinced 
that the security and safety of its personnel is the central element of any 
peacekeeping operation. As a result Ukraine initiated elaboration of the Convention 
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted by UN General 
Assembly in 1994. In September 2006 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
signed an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel. Ukraine also initiated the International Day of United Nations 
Peacekeepers which was designated by the UN General Assembly in 2002 to be 
marked annually on 29 of May in honor of the memory of those who have lost their 
lives for peace and those, who continue to serve in the UN peacekeeping operations. 
164
 
In addition to the peacekeeping activities the UN should become the universal 
global organization, which would prevent the escalation of conflict and avoid the 
necessity of such peacekeeping operations. The United Nations is not an “ideal” 
organization. It should complete a large complex of reforms to reach this status and 
make the world free of conflicts and wars. However, the process of the UN reforms 
started long time ago.  Ukraine also participates in the UN reforms. For example, in 
1997 Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on that time, was 
elected as a President of the 52nd UN General Assembly session, which is one of the 
offices in the UN system. Ukraine should be proud that the 52nd session of the UN 
General Assembly entered the history as the "session of reforms". That Session 
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accepted a comprehensive Program of the Organization's reform and gave a start for 
the formation of more effective the United Nations.165  
In the system of the United Nations Ukraine is a member of several principal 
and subsidiary UN organs such as the Human Rights Council, Committee on 
Contributions, Commission on Social Development, Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Statistical 
Commission, Commission on Population and Development, Executive Board of the 
World Food Programme (WFP), Executive Board of the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF). During its membership in the UN Ukraine was elected as non-
permanent member of the Security Council for three times (1948-1949, 1984-1985, 
2000-2001), a member of the UN Economic and Social Council for five times, the 
President of the Executive Board of the UNDP/UNFPA (2006), representatives of 
Ukraine served as chairmen of a number of important committees at the UN General 
Assembly sessions.166 
At the same time Ukraine is recipient of technical, material and financial 
assistance from the numerous UN institutions, such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), Global Ecological Fund (GEF), International Labor 
Organization (ILO), United Nations Conference On Trade And Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United 
Nations Population Fund (UNPFA), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
and others. The UNDP opened its Ukrainian office in 1993 to assist the economic, 
social, ecological and other reforms in Ukraine.167 Currently 13 International 
Organizations, Agencies, and Associated Institutions of the UN System with resident 
missions and programs and about 800 staff members work in Ukraine to enhance the 
cooperation between the United Nations and Ukraine in the spheres of socio-
economic development, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and 
other activities, which respond the aims of the UN Charter.168  
 For geopolitical interests of Ukraine it is significant fact to host such number 
of the UN representatives. Ukraine welcomes the progress on the reform of the 
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United Nations during the last years and believes in the future of this Organization as 
the universal global organization, which promotes the principles of peace, security 
and welfare. 
Among other long-standing important issues in the collaboration between 
Ukraine and the United Nations is problem of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear power 
Station accident. Ukraine continues to cooperate closely with the UN in the sphere of 
nuclear safety. For example, Ukraine and its capital Kiev hosted the world’s Summit 
on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy on April 2011. The visit of the 
United Nations Secretary - General Ban Ki Mun proved an importance of Ukraine in 
the global nuclear security. Mr. Mun emphasized on the need of global rethink on 
nuclear safety and role of Ukraine in the global security: “Ukraine has been a leader 
on nuclear issues.  It earned the world’s admiration when it voluntarily gave up its 
nuclear arsenal. … The international community stood firm on principle:  that in a 
democracy, people have the right to choose their leaders.  Leaders must respect the 
choice of leader.  The power comes from the people.  If you follow the news, you 
know how this story turns out.  But you may not know how Ukraine figures 
prominently in this process… Across the world, wherever United Nations 
peacekeepers serve, Ukraine is there:  Kosovo; Sudan; Liberia; Timor-Leste; and, 
most importantly, Côte d’Ivoire… Ukraine contributes to peace and security across 
the world.  Closer to home, Ukraine is a bridge, a regional player able to talk to big 
and small countries alike, east and west, north and south.”169 
The words of the UN Secretary-General confirm our thesis about the defining 
role of Ukrainian geopolitical location in the national foreign policy. Ukraine has to 
continue its work to prove its regional leadership status. The current geopolitical 
reality in the system of international relations requires the reform of the UN. The 
Central-Eastern Europe plays an important role in the context of European security 
and stability. That is why, we think that Ukrainian leadership has to think about the 
possibility of allocation of an additional non-permanent seat at the UN Security 
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Council to the Group of Eastern Europe and actively promotes this idea within a 
framework of the UN.170 
The United Nations is an effective instrument for Ukraine to achieve the 
world’s recognition of the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932-1933, one of the most 
tragic events in the history of humanity. The Great Famine, which was resulted in the 
death of 7 to 10 million people (a population of a mid-size European country), was 
officially recognized a national tragedy of the Ukrainian people caused by the Soviet 
totalitarian regime in 2003.The Joint Statement on the 70th anniversary of 
Holodomor was signed by 36 delegations and supported by 28 other UN Member 
States.  The list of states, who signed this document includes Albania, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Saint 
Lucia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America. Ukraine actively promotes the issue of 
Holodomor within a framework of the UN in order to bring a wider international 
attention to this tragedy of Ukrainian nation so that similar genocides could be 
avoided in future.171 
At present Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Economic 
Development and Trade Andriy Kliuyev and representatives of the UN System in 
Ukraine signed Government of Ukraine-United Nations Partnership Framework (PF) 
for 2012-2016 in Kiev on March, 2011.172 The PF includes “the fundamentals for 
strategic planning and UN activities in Ukraine for the next 5 years according to 4 
key areas of partnership: sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, social 
development, governance and management, environment and climate change. The 
new document sets a common commitment to supporting the reform process, 
achieving international standards, European integration, Millennium Development 
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Goals, as well as implementing the terms of international human rights norms by 
Ukraine.”173  
According to the Ukraine – UN Partnership Framework program the priorities 
for cooperation are directly linked to the “realizing of one or several human rights, 
social and economic development, supporting full and meaningful civil society 
participation and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The principles 
of universality and inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness, 
non discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, accountability and the 
rule of law are all central to each of the future areas of cooperation identified by 
Ukraine and the UN System in the PF.”174 
The programme is expected to replace the UN Development Assistance 
Framework for Ukraine 2006-2010. Mr. Kliuyev stated that the new framework 
programme will greatly contribute to the processes of development of an innovative 
potential of Ukraine, reforms in public administration and judicial system, improving 
the quality of social policy. Twenty UN agencies will participate in this program, and 
132 million of the US dollars will be granted by the UN System organizations to 
achieve the goals of this partnership framework program.175According to Mr. Oliver 
Adam, the UN Coordinator in Ukraine, the Framework Partnership Program will be 
“the main instrument response to UN national development priorities identified in 
key national plans and strategies”.176  
For Ukraine this Partnership program is very important instrument in the 
cooperation with the United Nations. The extended cooperation might help Ukraine’s 
socio-economic development and the achievement of Ukraine’s international 
commitments.  
In conclusion, we see the United Nations as an important global organization, 
which is called to unite the nations and prevent the escalation of conflicts and wars, 
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strengthen cooperation in solving international economic, political and socio-cultural 
problems. For Ukraine the United Nations is a powerful instrument to protect 
national interests and fundamental principals of domestic and foreign policy, assist 
economic and political reforms and receive a world’s recognition of its regional 
leadership status. 
 
4.2.The global problems of international community: the view from Kiev 
Today we live in the world, where every single individual and country can 
not exist in isolation. All of us live are interconnected and influenced by the same 
political, economic, socio-cultural, and informational changes. Pollution, corruption, 
human-trafficking, the proliferation of nuclear weapons or any other global problems 
do not have passports. The increasing process of globalization makes us more 
interdependent than it was centuries ago.177 The former the UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan said: “Globalization is bringing more choices and new opportunities for 
prosperity. It is making us more familiar with global diversity. However, millions of 
people around the world experience globalization not as an agent of progress but as a 
disruptive force, almost hurricane-like in its ability to destroy lives, jobs, and 
traditions. Many have an urge to resist the process and take refuge in the illusory 
comforts of nationalism, fundamentalism, or other isms.”178 
It is true. In the last decade the world community faced with a large number 
of global issues that affected all mankind. The existence of humanity directly 
depends on the solving of these problems. It can be achieved only by joint efforts of 
all countries and international organizations. These problems of global character 
include such issues as issues in proliferation of deadly, including nuclear, weapons, 
demographic problems, environmental problems, the increasing number of regional 
conflicts and wars, energy, food, diseases, peaceful exploration of space and ocean, 
corruption and many other problems. Every day we hear different negative 
predictions about the future of the world. However, only few of us try to change the 
situation and actively participate in the solving of global problems. 
For Ukraine as a member of world’s community it is extremely important to 
include the problems of global character to the modern geopolitical doctrine. Ukraine 
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has faced seriously with the problem of global character in 1986, when the biggest 
world’s nuclear disaster had a place in Chernobyl. In addition after the collapse of 
the USSR Ukraine inherited the world’s second nuclear potential. The new policy of 
disarmament and non-proliferation became a part of domestic and foreign policy.  
In the previous paragraphs we discussed an importance of Ukraine’s 
cooperation with the United Nations in the field of global problems and especially 
the problems of global security. However, before we start to explore Ukraine’s role 
in the globalizations processes in more detailed way we should divide global 
problems in the categories. In our opinion the global problems are dived into 
political, economic, demographic, social and ecological. 
The most important global problems are political. Since humanity invented 
the nuclear, biological, chemical and other deadly weapon, our world faced with the 
serious danger, because the usage of such weapon in local conflicts with political 
reasons could create great problems for all humanity. Ukraine, which had the world’s 
third nuclear potential, voluntarily refused from the nuclear weapon and significantly 
contributed to the global security and stability. However, other states like India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea declare the desire to develop such weapon. These 
actions together with the numerous regional conflicts, revolutionary separatist 
movements and permanent confrontation among the countries for a regional or global 
domination seriously threaten the current world’s order. In the same time Ukraine 
pays an especial attention to the conflict situations in the neighbor countries. The 
conflicts in Transdnistrovya area, Russia (Chechnya), Caucasus and other “frozen” 
conflicts in the former Soviet states are the part of global political problems. For 
Ukrainian leadership it is quite important to continue its work on the prevention of 
escalation conflicts in a region. 
The term “global” in the global ecological policy means all this transborder 
cooperation between the countries in the sphere of management of environmental 
problems. The modern “ecological crisis” appeared only in the end of the World War 
II. The increasing energy and resource consumption linked with economic 
developments processes, rising of pollution, global warming, demographic growth 
and the proliferation of new technologies, including nuclear weapon, created a 
serious threat to the all human civilization.179 The best world’s scientists-
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environmentalists, governments and non-profit organizations today work on the 
prevention of ecological catastrophes. The first such institution, which started 
focusing on improving the environmental situation, was the Club of Rome. The 
organization was established in 1968 and united outstanding scientists from all over 
the world. Ukrainian scientists have also participated in the environmental research 
processes, especially the situation related to the evaluation of the biosphere. 
They considered that a human as a part of technological civilization can threaten the 
biosphere as the global system. Such Ukrainian scientists as V. Los, E. Hirusov, F. 
Hirenok and M. Rebane considered the destructive changes in the biosphere as a 
global system as a result of the influence of human “pressure”. So, the solving of the 
ecological crisis includes a research on this "pressure" and the object of such 
“pressure”. 
Another scientist position T. Bachinsky based his theories on consideration 
that society and nature compose one system. He insisted on the immediate stop of the 
progressive destruction of the biosphere, because the result of this destruction will 
lead to the total collapse of socioecosystem. He admitted that the damaged biosphere 
will have a chance to restore its dynamic equilibrium again, but in the place where 
people will not exist anymore. That is why, the humanity has no choice and must 
change their attitude to the nature.180 
In some context the position of Ukrainian environmentalists and globalists 
remain as same pessimistic as the position of the Club of Rome. However, we 
consider that these scholars have reasonable arguments to claim in such manner.  
In Ukraine the ecological situation is result of the existence of Ukraine within the 
USSR. According to the Soviet planned, command-administrative system, economy 
developed without taking into account environmental problems. The huge allocation 
of chemical, metallurgical, mining production in the East of Ukraine created harmful 
environmental situation in these regions. The ecological situation was seriously 
worsened after terrible environmental consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Today 
Ukraine has 15 operating nuclear reactors, and builds 3 more. Such fact creates a 
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serious threat to the environmental situation in Ukraine and region.181 In this case 
only effective Ukraine’s government environmental policy together with cooperation 
with the international organizations can prevent the ecological catastrophes. 
Other serious global problem is population growth. Since the last 40 years the 
world’s population doubled and reached 7 billion people. Experts predict that the 
population would rich to 9 billion by 2050 (Figure 11). Such demographic changes 
will increase requirements for food, water, energy, and health care in countries where 
basic necessities were already limited. Malnourishment, lack of clean water, HIV- 
Aids and other diseases, overcrowding, and inadequate shelter, conflicts for 
provision and energy resources are the negative consequences of this global 
problem.182 In the same time some countries, including Ukraine, feel another 
problem – problem of depopulation processes. In 2006, Ukraine’s population was 
estimated to about 46.7 million people, almost 2.4 million fewer than it was in 2000. 
Historically, there are few explanations to such situation in Ukraine. First, the 
negative consequences of the World War II, where Ukraine lost millions of human 
lives, provoked the situation, when the today, later few generations women far 
outnumber men. In the East Slavic societies, which are considered traditionally 
patriarchal, and having sons is more desirable than having daughters. The 
transformation of Ukraine from rural agricultural to modern urban industrial state 
influenced declining rates in the population growth (urban families are much smaller 
than rural). With the dissolution of the USSR Ukraine received the difficult 
economic situation. As a result many people immigrated to the other countries in the 
1990s.183 Similarly to other European countries Ukraine faced with other problem 
related to the aging of population.  
In the context of the improvement of demographic situation in Ukraine we 
offer to adopt the new strategic national program, which would include the following 
elements: 
• Promotion of voluntary repatriation of people with historical Ukrainian 
roots to homeland; 
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• Improvement of the socio-economic living conditions;  
• Optimization of external and internal migration of population;  
• Support and consolidation of professional in the rural area; 
• Implementation of national healthcare programs; 
• Formation of high prestige of family in the society. 
Under economic and social global problems we should understand the 
complex of interconnected negative factors, which influence the level of welfare of 
every single individual or country. Economic and social problems include economic 
inequality, child labor, energy crises, corruption, economic disasters, unemployment, 
poverty, domestic violence and many other problems. Ukraine as a part of 
international community actively contributes to the solving of global economic and 
social problems. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych declared at the UN 
Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2010 that “Ukrainian state 
is ready to use its agricultural potential to assist the eradication of hunger on the 
planet… We responsibly work towards threats of food crisis. Last year Ukraine 
became for the first time a donor to the UN World Food Program”.184 The President 
Yanukovych also described Ukraine’s efforts to the complete modernization of the 
economy and social policy, which are designed to respond the MDGs. These reforms 
include the increased level of minimum social standards, where Ukraine has  
significantly reduced number of people living below the poverty line.185 
In conclusion, a popular internet blog “The Foreign policy of Ukraine” names 
the following global problems and the ways to solve them: 
• Economic inequality. This problem is an especially important because its 
solution leads to the solving of all other problems. The top 20 industrialized 
and developed countries consume 20 times more resources than all other 
states. Now we conclude that the development of consumer society and its 
unequal distribution to all countries in the world can lead to the planetary 
catastrophe. 
• Issues of war and peace, international security, disarmament and conversion 
determine the level of confidence and cooperation between the nations. 
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Disarmament is a key to create an international secure world. Solving this 
problem should be made by the efforts of all states and people. 
• The environmental problems are a result of increasing human poisoning and 
pollution of land, water and atmosphere. A substantial violation of the 
balance of the gas composition of the atmosphere, ozone layer of the 
atmosphere, the state of living and inanimate nature are the reason of the 
ecological catastrophe. International community has to unite in order to stop 
the damaging of our planet. 
• Food problem – food shortages in many countries cause the death of millions 
people every year. The launch of World Food Program at the United Nations 
is an instrument to prevent this problem. The worlds leading agricultural 
states, such as Argentina, Brazil, USA, France, China and Australia should 
become responsible for this project. Ukraine as one of the leading European 
agricultural states should actively expand the its donor assistance to the WFP 
• The demographic problems are rapid growth of population in some regions 
(Africa, Asia, Oceania) and depopulation processes and ageing of population 
in European states, including Ukraine. 
• The socio-economic problems refer social, economic and individual rights 
and freedoms, combating international crime and terrorism, drug addiction, 
the humanization of international relations. All these issues concern each of 
us. The consolidation of cooperation among all the countries will create a 
framework to solve the global problems in the close future.186 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion we would like to summarize the main results of our research 
and formulate the final position on the most optimal geopolitical doctrine, which 
would respond the main geopolitical interests of Ukraine. 
The main results, which have theoretical and practical importance, are: 
1. We systematically analyzed the major theoretical approaches to the term 
“geopolitics” and “national interest” in general and Ukrainian geopolitics 
and its interests, in particular. In our opinion, the term “geopolitics” is 
wider than its classic interpretation. We see “geopolitics” as the national 
doctrine of the state or its national science, which is called to form and 
promote a strategy of decision-making processes that would protect vital 
national interests. This strategy is often based on the territorial size and 
location of the state, its military strength, natural resources, population, 
economic growth, historical and socio-cultural development. The first 
approach simply equates the national interest with the interest of decision-
makers, who are responsible for the foreign policy defined and defended 
by the state authority. The second approach explains the national interest 
in the terms of the nature of international relations and the motivations of 
state. In the anarchic system of the international relations the interest is 
often defined in the terms of power, and power in the terms of interest 
(Realist school of thought). The last third approach explains the “national 
interest” as something, which derives from the nation’s preferences of 
democratic state. For us, it is important to have a clear understanding of 
the history of Ukrainian nation and state-building processes, the traditions 
of Ukrainian political, socio-economic, cultural and religious life to 
understand all the specifics of Ukrainian geopolitical processes and 
formulate the national interests of Ukraine. 
2. We conducted an analysis of the formation of Ukraine’s geopolitics in the 
historical perspective. The analysis of history of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
and geopolitics from the era of Kievan Rus to the modern period of 
Ukrainian state revealed that geographical, political, economic and socio-
cultural position of Ukraine was changing throughout the history. At the 
same time historically, mentally and culturally Ukrainian nation remained 
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to be an integral part of European community. Historically Ukrainian state 
was located at the crossroads of Western and Eastern civilization. This 
fact became a reason for the artificial division of Ukrainian people and the 
absence of social and political unity for the long centuries. Started from 
Kievan Rus, a precursor of the future Eastern European Slavic countries, 
Ukraine underwent more than a thousand year history of struggle for own 
geopolitical interests. Ukrainian nation was forced to lose the state 
independence in the different periods of time.   However, Ukrainian 
people could recover its full independence and the right to conduct own 
foreign policy, which would respond the national interests. 
3. Today Ukraine as a modern European state conducts an open 
multidimensional foreign policy, which is called to expand cooperation 
with all interested partners, and provide the protection of own geopolitical 
interests. At the same time Ukrainian government wants to build the 
relations with its strategic partners exclusively on the principles of 
voluntarism, mutual aid, mutual non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit, 
non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful coexistence. The 
precondition for the analysis of the relations between Ukraine and its 
strategic partners is a clear understanding of the basic historical values, 
principals and interests of Ukrainian people. For country, which fought 
for own independence for the long centuries, the question of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens, respect to the human 
rights and main principals of international law define the aims Ukrainian 
geopolitics.  
4. Due to its unique geopolitical location between the Slavic Eurasia and 
Western Europe Ukraine has a wide range of geopolitical interests not 
only within a region, but also outside this region. The main principles on 
which Ukraine develops its own foreign policy based on the respect of 
international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe and other international documents. Throughout 
the history Ukraine had to reorient its interests and find new partners. 
Ukraine as a potential regional leader state builds pragmatic and mutually 
beneficial relations with all countries. However, the relations with other 
regional post-socialist states of the Central-Eastern Europe and the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States are defined as key priorities of 
Ukrainian foreign policy. The relations with the countries of the CEE and 
CIS are characterized as friendly and mutually beneficial. Such 
relationship is explained not only, by the common socialist past, but 
similar history of transition processes, cultural similarities and the 
position on the global issues. After Ukraine’s accession to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty the USA and Russia became new strategic partners of 
Ukraine. Due to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 
1994 both countries declared their security guarantees and strategic 
cooperation with Ukraine. Historically, geographically, linguistically, and 
culturally Ukraine and Russia are linked and interdependent. Such 
interdependence explains the high level of strategic mutual beneficial 
cooperation in the relations between two countries. The USA is a key 
partner of Ukraine in the sphere of democracy, economic and political 
reforms, military, transport, nuclear, aerospace and scientific 
cooperation. For Ukraine the strategic partnership with the USA is 
especially important. The USA is powerful enough to counter the strategic 
weight of other strategic partner, neighboring Russia with its little, but 
still imperialist ambitions, extremely growing China or the potential threat 
from the hypothetic union of Islamic states.  
5. Ukraine as a member of world community actively cooperates with other 
countries within a framework of international organizations. As a subject 
of international law Ukraine considers international organizations as an 
effective instrument for the multilateral cooperation with other countries 
in the solving of its geopolitical interests. As a founding member of the 
United Nations Ukraine considers this universal organization as a 
framework to promote and keep peace throughout the world, develop 
friendly relations with other nations and help nations work together to 
solve the global problems. Ukraine is an active member of all the agencies 
and structures within the UN System. The UN Peacekeeping activity, 
World Food Program, nuclear safety projects is a short example of such 
collaboration between Ukraine and the United Nations. The main 
document to regulate the cooperation between Ukraine – the United 
Nations is Partnership Framework program, which is called to expand the 
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cooperation on the respect for human rights, social and economic 
development, support civil society participation and achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals. The principles of universality, 
indivisibility, interdependence, non discrimination, equality, participation 
and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law are all central in the 
cooperation within a framework of this program. 
Before we formulate our personal recommendation on the most optimal 
geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine, we would like to summarize the main theoretical 
considerations about the geopolitical potential of Ukraine.  
Being the largest contiguous European state (in size it is bigger than France, 
Germany or Spain), Ukraine owns a unique geopolitical location in Europe. It stands 
at the crossroads of the main transport and trade routs between Eurasia and Western 
Europe. Ukraine owns an access to the Black and Asov seas, the wide rivers network 
and the large areas of lands suitable for agricultural industries (over 40 million 
hectares). Ukraine is rich in mineral resources, including the reserves of coal, iron 
ore, nickel, uranium, the world’s largest reserves of sulfur, the second world’s largest 
reserves of mercury ore and many others.  More than 48 million people live in 
Ukraine, which makes it the fifth most populous European country. Ukraine has one 
of the biggest military potential in a region and Europe in total. Ukraine is an active 
participant of the United Nation Peacekeeping mission. Since 1992 more Ukraine 
sent more than 40 000 soldiers to the 20 countries. Ukraine is currently participating 
in 6 on-going operations. High level of intellectual, scientific and economic 
potential, including high-technologies (like aerospace engineering and nuclear 
research) makes Ukraine an important geopolitical player in the region.  
In addition, the author welcomes a clear understanding of the current 
Ukrainian leadership to continue its further political and socio-economic 
development in order to keep the status of regional leader. In this regard, basing on 
the recent trends in Ukraine’s geopolitics, analysis of history of Ukraine, the 
geostrategic relations of Ukraine with its partners and current globalization processes 
we would like to conclude the following geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine: 
“Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation, who fought for the long 
centuries for own independence, determines the question of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens and the respect to the main principals of 
international law as the key priority of its geopolitics. Historically, geographically 
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and culturally Ukraine is an integral part of European community. In this regard, 
Ukraine should continue to strengthen its economic and political potential, including 
the intensification of participation in Euro-Atlantic integration processes. At the 
same time, Ukraine should not gain a membership in any political supranational 
organizations, which could threaten national interests. In the cooperation with such 
institutions, including military organizations, Ukraine needs to follow the principle 
of “active neutrality”. However, Ukraine considers such organizations as an effective 
instrument for the multilateral cooperation with other countries in the solving of 
global problems, including security in Europe and world, in total. The conclusion of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, participation in European and global security 
structures, and active cooperation with such organizations as NATO, EU, and the 
United Nations will provide the establishment of security and peace in Ukraine. 
Being a member of international community Ukraine develops strategic relations 
with all countries in correspondence with geopolitical interests and priorities of 
Ukraine. The strengthening and consolidation of strategic relations with neighboring 
countries of the Central-Eastern Europe and the New Independent States is an 
extremely important for Ukraine in the context of regional stability and security. 
Ukraine should also support and continue to develop equal and mutually beneficial 
political, socio-economic and cultural relations with its strategic partners USA and 
Russian Federation. Being located at the crossroads of East and West of Europe r 
Ukraine needs to create its own system of national security, balanced and 
coordinated, which would respond European and global international 
security. Ukraine should also continue its political and socio-economic development 
processes in order to become democratic, stable and economically developed state.” 
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